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This dissertation examined the presidential elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000 for 
the narrative tools used to persuade Latino voters.  Using Walt Fisher’s narrative theory, 
I evaluated the various parts of the American Dream myth, looking specifically at the 
characters and settings used in the candidate’s narrative.  Then, I evaluated the values in 
those narratives through the lens of the Plan of Delano,  specifically looking for ways 
these candidates actually reinforced important Latino values.  
The new tellings of the American Dream myth valued specific characters—
characters that had been blessed by the American Dream. Clinton’s 1992 character had 
to work to gain success, but he was also blessed. George P. Bush (George W. Bush’s 
nephew) was another character blessed by the American Dream.  As a first-generation 
American, he represented the hope that brings many to America; the idea that their 
children could have opportunities the parents could not.  
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 The settings of the American Dream story were also important.  These settings 
varied greatly—from the decrepit and desolate to the fanciful and idyllic—but they 
represented all the different places where the American Dream is possible.   
Hope, Arkansas is not a place where much hope seems to exist.  But even a 
community as impoverished as Hope can be the birthplace of a President, because of the 
amazing ability of the Dream to permeate even the darkest corners of America.  The 
barrios of the Southwest appear to be hopeless, but as Clinton’s telling of the myth 
reminded Latinos, even people growing up in the barrios should have hope—because the 
American Dream can exist anywhere.    
 These values, these characters, these settings have added to the rich rhetorical 
history of the American Dream myth. These presidential candidates expanded the places 
where that hope could reach, and the people who could be blessed by the Dream. All of 
this culminated in a story that Latinos could relate to, that they shared in and that 
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This dissertation follows the style of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: LATINOS IN AMERICA 
Electing an American president has always been a difficult task: influenced by 
the power of the media, lobbyists, and advertisements—campaigning represents 
partisanship at its best, or worst.1  However, the task has become even more complex 
given the nation’s increased diversity.  During the last forty years, ethnic groups’ 
influence over the electoral process has grown.  What we now call “interest” politics has 
become a critical part of the election process.2  “Interest” politics include many different 
groups—such as soccer moms and NASCAR Dads—but some of the most influential 
groups are ethnically based.  Politicians must learn to engage these increasingly 
important groups.3   
Hispanics are one such major “interest” group.4  Over the last several decades, 
American culture has become “Latinized.”  As actor Antonio Banderas argued in 2002 
to a convention of television advertisers, “Latinos are hot, and we are not the only ones 
who think so.  Everyone wants to jump on the bandwagon, and why not?  We have the 
greatest art, music, and literature.  It is time we tell our stories.”5 In the 2000 Census the 
Hispanic population was at 38.8 million or 13.5% of the total U.S. population, up 57.9% 
from the 1990 census.6  Whether through the filtration of the Hispanic culture into 
mainstream popular culture or through the constantly growing legal and illegal Latino 
communities, American politics has likewise been infused with a Latin element.7  
Latinos’ concentration in more populated states makes them an important political force.  
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With 88% of the Latino population concentrated in California, Texas, Florida, New 
York, Arizona, Illinois, New Mexico, New Jersey, Colorado and Virginia, it influences 
the 232 electoral votes of those eleven states.  During the 2004 election many of those 
states, except for California, Texas, Massachusetts and Illinois, represented swing 
states.1   
Presidential campaigns have begun to reach out to this important contingent.  The 
Washington Post, Univision and the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute’s 2004 poll found that 
40% of registered Hispanic voters felt that in the 2004 presidential campaign both Bush 
and Kerry made a sincere effort to reach out to Hispanics.2  In the end, it appeared that 
Bush connected with the Hispanic community more than his opponent, John Kerry.  The 
numbers are not conclusive, but according to Republican leaders, Bush won 44% of the 
Latino vote, up almost nine points from the 2000 election.3  The Democratic numbers 
show that Bush won closer to 34 % of the Hispanic vote.4  Regardless, Bush and the 
Republicans appeared to be making inroads with the Hispanic community: Hispanics’ 
support for the Democratic Party has been decreasing since 1996 when Clinton won 72% 
of the Latino vote.5  However Democrats regained their foothold in 2008, President 
Barack Obama gained 67% of the Hispanic vote, the reason for this shift is still being 
explored by researchers across the nation.6 
Recent campaigns have identified the Latino population as an important 
contingent.  Latinos, as a voting block, have not shown their power politically, despite 
several elections being coined (by the media) as the “Year of the Hispanic,” none of 
those predictions have come true.7 Yet, the United States borders on becoming a Latino 
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nation.  As journalist and Hispanic political scholar Jorge Ramos asserts, “Hispanics will 
elect the next American President.”8  
This dissertation will argue that presidential candidates have been able to reach 
the Latino population through the use of narratives—specifically the story of the 
American Dream—and that Latinos have helped elect candidates who campaign in a 
way that suggests those candidates understand Latinos better than their opponents. In 
this chapter, I will take a closer look at what it means to be Hispanic, what differentiates 
Latinos from the general population, the history of minority political power in the United 
States, an analysis of narratives and the American Dream and how that Dream is 
interpreted by Latinos, specifically looking at the Plan of Delano.  
Who Is Latino? 
The difficulty in defining the terms Latino or Hispanic comes from their 
interchangeability.  These terms appear simple, and yet represent a broad range of 
people.  The term Latino relates to the ancient region Latium in modern-day Italy.9  It 
also refers to “a native or inhabitant of Latin America, [or] a person of Latin-American 
origin living in the U.S.”10  People who reject the term Latino often do so because they 
argue that they do not speak Latin.11  Hispanic means “of, relating to or being a person 
of Latin American descent living in the U.S.; especially one of Cuban, Mexican, or 
Puerto Rican origin.”12 The etymology of ‘Hispanic’ has its roots in Hispania, the 
antiquated name for the Iberian Peninsula.  Connotatively, it also refers to Spanish 
conquests during the medieval period, which is why some refuse to use this term.13 
However, Hispanic was the legal term used in the U.S. Census from 1970 until 2000.14  
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Both terms, Latino and Hispanic, only have meaning in the United States because they 
refer to those who live within this nation.  Among other Hispanics, both in the United 
States and abroad, Latinos refer to themselves based on their ancestry.  For example, I 
would say I am Mexicana y Uruguaya (Mexican and Uruguayan).  This delineates my 
ancestry to anyone who might ask; clearly, there is not a box for “Mexicana y 
Uruguaya” in the Census reports, so I tend to check “Hispanic.”15  
The other problem with defining who is Hispanic involves the issue of race.  As 
historian George J. Sanchez found when he asked a Mexican American history class to 
fill out a questionnaire about their ethnicity [identical to the U.S. Census] at the 
University of Southern California: 
All Americans were asked whether they had “Hispanic ancestry” and then, in a 
separate question what their own racial background was.  This second question 
allowed for multiple responses, but did not include a category for Mexican or 
Latino as a race. . .  One student explained that all the members of her family had 
answered the racial question differently, depending on their own self-identities.  
Her father had checked “white,” whereas her mother had checked both “white 
and Indian.”  She herself had checked “other” and filled in “Mexican” as her 
racial designation.16 
 
This anecdote represents the problem of identity facing Latinos: some do not consider 
themselves “white” (and some purposefully refuse to use this term because of 
connotations about white supremacy and loss of culture) and many do not consider 
themselves “black,” so they tend to feel invisible in America’s over-simplified black and 
white society.17   
 Researchers in sociology, history and Chicano studies have identified two factors 
that unify this diverse population.  These characteristics separate the Hispanic population 
from the general population: “having experienced a colonial relationship to the United 
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States as a people, and having come to the continental United States as an 
immigrant/migrant group.”18  The U. S. Census divided Hispanics into four major 
ethnicities: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban and Other.  Of the 35.3 million Hispanics 
identified in the 2000 Census, 20.7 million (59%) were Mexican, 3.0 million (8.5%) 
were Puerto Rican, 1.4 million (4%) were Cuban, 6.6 million (18.6%) identified as Other 
(South/Central American and Other).19  The three largest groups tend to be the most 
vocal, therefore gaining the most attention from political candidates.  The three largest 
groups do share the immigrant experience, and do have the experience of colonialism by 
the United States.20  This shared experience places them under the “Hispanic/Latino” 
umbrella. 
 Because of differences in histories, these three groups are culturally separate 
which makes it difficult to lump them together under one name.21 Each group has 
retained its own culture and identity. These different histories have also led to 
differences in their views of U.S. politics, opportunity and economic status.  Discussing 
each major group separately will allow for a more accurate view of the power of 
socialization, and the differences in each group. 
The History of Latinos 
 It is difficult to say where Mexican-American history began.  During the 1640s 
when Spaniard José Francisco Canales first landed in the “New World,” he settled near 
modern day Monterrey.  Through Spanish colonialism, the Mexican peninsula was 
quickly taken over.  In the 1800’s when Irish, British and German settlers began to head 
west, they confronted the Spanish and Native communities, and began to take over the 
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continent.  The new settlers threatened Mexicans, questioning their claim on land that 
they had owned, lived on, and worked for generations.  In 1846 when Texas became a 
part of the United States, many Mexicans became U.S. citizens overnight. Mexicans, 
especially in South Texas, were seen as obstacles to progress, because they owned 
valuable land, or because of their “backwards” ways; consequently, violence became a 
daily occurrence.22 In 1855, a reporter for Galveston Weekly News reported the lynching 
of eleven Mexicans, “The whole race of Mexicans here is becoming a useless 
commodity, becoming cheap, dog cheap.  Eleven Mexicans, it is stated, have been found 
along the Nueces [River] in a hung up condition.  Better so than to be left on the ground 
for the howling lobos to tear in pieces, and then howl the more for the red peppers that 
burn his insides raw.”23  Mexican Americans faced violence like this almost daily.  Some 
scholars have compared the violence to the horrors faced by African-Americans in the 
Deep South.24 Despite the work of a few Mexicans to stop the encroachment of Anglos 
on their land, most Mexicans lost their land, their rights and the peace that independence 
had offered.  This discrimination continued until the 1960s when the civil rights 
movement began to make differences in the Deep South, including Texas.  Today, most 
Mexicans reside in the Southwest (Texas, California New Mexico and Arizona), a large 
population also resides in Illinois.25  While Mexican immigrants have faced the problem 
of being dominated on their own soil, Cuban and Puerto Rican immigrants have had a 
very different immigrant experience. 
 At the end of World War II the world’s politics had changed drastically: there 
were two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and many newly independent 
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countries.  Consequently, the two superpowers worked to control the smaller countries 
and to ideologically co-opt the leaders of these small nations.  President Truman created 
a foreign aid policy that would allow for this ideological warfare: the Point Four 
Program.26  Proposed in his January 20, 1949 Inaugural Address, the program was based 
literally on the fourth point of his speech: “We must embark on a bold new program for 
making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”27  Congress approved the program 
in June of 1950.28  San Juan, Puerto Rico became the headquarters for the Point Four 
Program because the U. S. government agreed to remake Puerto Rico into a model of 
American capitalism for the Third World. 29  This included eliminating the shantytowns 
in San Juan (which made up almost fifty percent of housing), raise the yearly income of 
each household, and conceal Puerto Rico’s colonial status.  The American government 
and the Puerto Rican government accomplished these goals by designating Puerto Rico a 
U.S. Commonwealth, including giving federal assistance to build a better infrastructure.  
Second, the governments created Operation Bootstrap, which was used to attract U.S. 
businesses to the island, and finally, they initiated a program of lower airfare costs to 
promote migration from the island to the mainland.30  For the U.S. government, the Point 
Four Program was a success, more than thirty thousand government officials went to 
Puerto Rico and trained with the program.  However, the program had some negative 
consequences as well.    
The poorest citizens of Puerto Rico migrated to the U.S., where they continued to 
live in poverty.  Offered no assistance by the government, their fate was sealed as some 
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of the poorest citizens of this nation.31 More than a million Puerto Ricans lived in the 
United States by the mid-1960s.32  Most Puerto Ricans have settled in the Northeast 
(61%) -- primarily in New York, however, there is a small group (14%) in Florida.33 
While Cubans and Puerto Ricans have shared in the colonial experience of American 
domination, the federal government has treated them very differently. 
Both Cuban and Puerto Rican migration to the United States began as an answer 
to the geopolitical climate, and at the behest of the American government.  Cubans 
began migrating to the United States after the communist revolution that brought Fidel 
Castro to power in 1959.34 This revolution changed geopolitical power structures for two 
reasons: first, it brought America’s worst fear, communism, to within 100 miles of the 
border. Second, it created an excellent opportunity for propaganda about the superiority 
of capitalism and democracy.  After the military debacle of the Bay of Pigs, American 
foreign policy focused on an ideological war with Castro.  America began a trade 
embargo against Cuba in 1964, which continues to this day.  As George W. Ball, 
undersecretary of the State Department argued in 1964, an important component of the 
embargo was a philosophical war.  “The objectives which this program can accomplish 
are to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that Communism has no 
future in the Western Hemisphere. . . .  to make plain to the people of Cuba . . . that the 
present regime cannot serve their interests.”35 The government began a Cuban Refugee 
Program that assisted refugees by allowing them access to the United States, giving them 
a fast track for citizenship, job training, language classes, educational support, education 
loans, health care and financial assistance to support their move.  In the fifteen years 
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between 1961 and 1974, the U.S. government spent $1.3 billion in aid to approximately 
seven hundred thousand Cuban refugees.36   
The refugees who arrived in the U.S. were from the higher classes in Cuban 
society, mostly managers, military officers, doctors, lawyers, scientists and their 
families.37 In 1962, when the Cuban Refugee Program was originally discussed, 
President John F. Kennedy explained why helping Cubans was important: “From the 
earliest days of our history, this land has been a refuge for the oppressed . . . helping 
those who are forced to flee to maintain their lives as . . . human-beings.”38  President 
Johnson also worked to protect and aide refugees from Cuba with the 1966 Cuban 
Adjustment Act, which made Cuban immigrants instantly eligible for Medicaid, food 
stamps, public health assistance, business credit and start-up loans for their business 
ventures.39  The CIA also employed about twelve thousand Cubans by 1962; the CIA 
was one of the largest employers in Miami.  These opportunities and government-funded 
programs allowed many Cuban immigrants to have a higher standard of living than most 
immigrants were enjoying at the time.40   
Even today, most Cubans continue to reside in the south Florida area.41 Cubans 
are the most successful subgroup of the Hispanic ethnicity.  For example, fifty percent of 
Mexicans do not have a high school degree, compared to only twenty-nine percent of 
Cubans.  Only eleven percent of Cubans live below the poverty line, whereas twenty-
five percent of Mexicans and forty-three percent of Puerto Ricans live in poverty.42 
Government programs created for Cuban immigrants in the 1960’s have led to some 
problems between Cubans and other Latino groups, as none of the other immigrant 
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groups had access to help from the government.  This rift between groups has led to both 
a philosophical and political polarization between Puerto Ricans, Mexicans and Cubans; 
however, political candidates continue to treat them as a homogenous group.  
The modern Hispanic community has kept many of the characteristics and ideals 
of their immigrant fore parents, which makes it difficult to create a message to touch this 
unique and diverse community; therefore, it is important that we understand who they 
are.  Despite the differences in these groups, the present analysis follows in the footsteps 
of other scholars and studies Hispanics as a unified whole.  There are several reasons 
why I chose this path.  First, this constitutes the way that the various political entities 
treat the Latino community.  A great deal of the statistical research does not make 
distinctions among the various facets of this group, and it would be difficult to draw 
distinctions the research does not provide.  Second, as other scholars have noted, it is 
important to focus on what this community has in common with the larger national 
community, not what separates them.  For the most part I will deal with the group in a 
panethnic (general) way.  There will be a few notable exceptions, as they relate 
specifically to the criticism. 
Characteristics of the Latino Community  
 The Latino community holds unique values and ideas that are vital to 
understanding their political ideology.  In many ways Latinos differ greatly from 
mainstream American culture, a problem that has caused trouble as Latinos assimilate 
into American culture.  Hispanic’s assimilation into American culture occurs more 
slowly than many other minorities.  Latinos have assimilated into American culture in 
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some ways, but in other ways, its members refuse to conform.  For example, Hispanics 
have exported the ideals of democracy and a market economy to their home countries.  
Nevertheless, in other areas, such as culture, and the adoption of values, Latinos refuse 
to change.43  Hispanics differ because of their commitment to the Spanish language, 
views on culture, family and religious values and the role of democracy.   
Whereas Spanish was once the main connection between people of Latin descent, 
the power of the Spanish language is faltering in many Hispanic households; it still 
connects Latinos, but subsequent generations are not as bound by language as their 
ancestors.  Many second- and third-generation immigrants do not speak fluent Spanish; 
93 percent of second-generation Hispanics are bilingual or speak English 
predominantly.44 Many young Hispanics have begun to lose full command of the 
language, and have therefore begun to speak a mixture of Spanish and English. 45  
Spanglish is growing more and more popular, especially in the Southwest, and has also 
begun to infiltrate popular culture.  Spanish-speaking television stations (such as 
Univision and Telemundo) use a mixture of Spanish and English phrases in their news 
programs.  This practice does cause some criticism from the community, especially from 
people who would like to preserve Spanish in its most correct form.  However, as 
Noticiero Univision anchor Jose Ramos argues in his book The Latino Wave, “We speak 
the way we live, and--far from denoting a lack of depth or dedication--our language 
simultaneously expresses conflict and an expansive wealth of culture.”46 While the use 
of Spanish connects candidates with the Latino community, being able to speak Spanish 
is not the key.  Understanding the values, opinions and mindset of the Hispanic 
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community allows a candidate to connect with Hispanics.  In order to understand Latino 
voters, one must first understand their culture and their country of origin.  
 Cultural differences cause a distinction between Hispanic voters and Anglo 
voters, especially related to issues of assimilation.  Despite their movement to the United 
States, many Hispanic immigrants (and their children) tend to stay very connected both 
financially and emotionally with their nations of origin.47  In countries such as Mexico, 
the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, remittances have become an important part of 
the national economy.48  In El Salvador remittance averaged more than a billion dollars a 
year, and became the largest source of foreign exchange.49  Emotionally, many 
Hispanics view themselves as world citizens, and therefore feel both “here” (America), 
and “there” (their ancestral country).  Sociologist Peggy Levitt has argued that the 
“social remittances” of Dominican and Brazilian immigrants has affected the values, 
social and cultural practices of those still living in their country of origin, because 
expatriates export American ideals and thinking along with the financial assistance they 
offer to family abroad.50  
 Even the religious community has allowed Latinos to keep their cultural 
heritage, while still worshipping in a Euro-dominated church.  The Catholic Church in 
particular, has allowed for the combination of traditional Latino practices into the 
structured liturgy, by allowing the liturgy to be spoken in Spanish.  These same 
allowances are not given to other ethnic groups, and many believe that the Church’s 
leniency directly relates to the number of Latinos in the laity.51 As Peruvian writer Mario 
Vargas Llosa argues, “This is the first time in history where a community originating 
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outside the United States has not been subject to the homogenizing process of the 
cultural melting pot . . .  in order to be recognized as ‘Americans.’”52   
 Hispanics are participants in the political system, and for the most part support 
American policy and cultural values (such as equal opportunity and the importance of 
education).53  However, Hispanics differ from the general population when it comes to 
questions of social policy, and this represents the area that has caused problems for the 
Democratic Party.  Large numbers of Latinos oppose abortion (77 percent), homosexual 
marriage or adoption (72 percent) and divorce (40 percent); these numbers are about 
twenty percent higher than the Anglo-American population.  Moreover, these same 
Latino voters believe that the morals and values in the United States are deteriorating (72 
percent), and feel that Hispanic families are stronger than white families (79 percent).54   
Latinos’ values tend to vary greatly from the general American population, 
which affects this community’s political views.  Whereas twenty-five percent of 
Americans claim to have no religious preference, only thirteen percent of Latinos deny 
any religious affiliation.55 Moreover, research demonstrates that religious Latinos tend to 
be Catholic, more than seventy-percent of Mexicans, sixty-five percent of Puerto Ricans 
and seventy-five percent of Cubans self-identify as Catholics.56 Hispanics also make 
religion a daily part of their life more often than their American counterparts do:  less 
than half (41%) of Mexican-Americans attend church at least once a month, which is 
only slightly higher than the Anglo number (30%).  Nevertheless, Latinos keep religion 
around them on an informal basis: more than three-fourths of Mexicans and Puerto 
Ricans have home altars, are involved in pilgrimages and light candles in church on a 
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regular basis.57  These beliefs have led to a disconnection between Latinos and Anglo-
Americans because many Hispanic’s views of the Anglo-American family and American 
values are greatly affected by their religiosity.  In addition, this strong connection to 
faith also affects Latinos’ politics. 
Most Americans believe that participation is a part of democracy; however, 
Latinos as a group are absent from the polls.  Unlike their Anglo or even African-
American counterparts, Latino voters have tended to be apathetic toward partisan 
politics.58  Despite research that argues that most Hispanics identify with the Democratic 
Party (more than two to one), that connection does not translate into party loyalty.  
Roberto Suro, director of the Pew Hispanic Center concluded the 2002 Pew Hispanic 
Center and Kaiser Family Foundation report with this caveat, “Despite strong 
Democratic leanings, Latinos show significant partisan ambivalence.  At a time of very 
sharp partisan divisions, they’re not ideologically committed to either of the major 
parties.”59 There are several reasons for this ambivalence.  First, their connection with 
Democrats began during the 1940’s and 1950’s when the migrant farm workers 
movements associated themselves with liberals, idealists and progressives.60 However, 
that association no longer exists.  Second, the “hot-button” issues that are prevalent in 
the Democratic Party are contrary to most Hispanics religious beliefs.61 As political 
scholars have seen Southern conservatives become Republicans because of differences 
with the Democratic Party on matters of religion and other social issues, so have some 
Latinos become Republicans.  
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The relationship between the major political parties and Latinos has a long, and 
somewhat convoluted history.  Much of that history is directly related to the history of 
African-Americans’ struggle for equality and other civil rights groups. But Latinos also 
have been treated separately from other minority groups.  
History of Minority Groups’ Political Influence 
Minority groups became an important constituency much later than common 
wisdom might suggest.62  African-Americans’ hard fight to gain respect and equality laid 
important groundwork for Latino advances that would follow in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Even though the 1870 passage of the Constitution’s Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed 
the right to vote to former slaves, those ‘voters’ were essentially ignored by the late 19th 
century presidents.63  Politicians ignored African-Americans because they believed 
African-Americans would not have enough political power to make a difference in an 
election.64  Ironically, part of the daily intimidation and discrimination African-
Americans faced in the 19th century included intimidating freed slaves into not voting.65   
Party affiliation was not what modern wisdom would suggest, during the 1800’s 
and 1900’s the Republican Party was the party of equality.  Wendel Philips Dabney 
explained that during the late 1800’s and early 1900’s “a great mass of Negroes [sic] 
regarded white Democrats as the Devil’s chosen children, and a Negro Democrat was a 
creature of such depravity that hell was far too good for him.”66  In the early 1900’s a 
few prominent African-Americans did begin to make connections with the White House, 
namely W.E.B. Dubois and Booker T. Washington.  Washington, because of his 
conservative views, worked with presidents from Grover Cleveland to Theodore 
   16 
 
Roosevelt.67  Washington was the recipient of “selective preferment” that was used to 
favor certain African-American leaders to appease the masses.  “The ultimate goal of 
selective preferment was to defuse radicalism by rewarding in general terms moderate to 
conservative political behavior.”68   
Washington and his successors, such as Emmett J. Scott and Robert Moton, used 
their political power to control the African-American community for many years.69 They 
controlled it mainly by controlling access to the President and others in power.  When 
President Taft considered DuBois for an appointed position, Washington began a rumor 
campaign against DuBois, arguing to Taft (and his confidantes) that DuBois had no 
power in the African-American community.  He also argued that DuBois was anti-Taft.  
Other African-American leaders who questioned Washington’s power in the White 
House received similar treatment.70 Despite all of the work Washington did to advance 
African-Americans’ power in Washington D.C., their advancement was cosmetic at best. 
Presidents of this era, from Rutherford Hayes to Herbert Hoover, “did almost 
nothing to advance the cause of civil rights.”71 These presidents attempted to silence any 
discontent within the African-American community with token efforts at appeasement.  
This attitude changed in 1930, during the presidency of Herbert Hoover, with the defeat 
of Supreme Court nominee John J. Parker.  After Parker’s nomination, past statements 
he made began appearing in the African-American community, thanks to NAACP 
publicity.  Parker, an unabashed segregationist, routinely denigrated “the capacity of 
blacks for electoral politics.”72  When leaders of the Tuskegee Institute became aware of 
this, they refused to give Hoover the endorsement he requested.  Republicans and the 
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moderate Tuskegee Institute always had a good relationship, but the organization drew 
the line with a segregationist judicial nominee.  The Tuskegee Institute and the NAACP 
did not defeat Parker single-handedly, but his defeat signaled to the president and other 
politicians that this particular constituency possessed the political shrewdness to matter.  
As historian Russell L. Riley argues, “What that loss represented . . . was the beginnings 
of a slow evolution in the political calculus of race relations in the United States.  
Further, it hinted at the ultimate futility of presidential efforts to control fully those 
relations.”73 After this win, the African-American community found a fickle friend in 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
History remembers the FDR Administration as friendlier to civil rights than it 
really was.  As historians have argued, FDR worked to advance relations with the 
African-American community when it benefited his political interests.74 However, in 
1934 Walter White and Roy Wilkins (two NAACP leaders) decided to use the First Lady 
to reach the President — one of the most pivotal decisions that civil rights leaders ever 
made.75  Eleanor Roosevelt became one of the strongest public advocates for the civil 
rights movement.  Her commitment stemmed from a “[d]eeply held personal interest in 
economic and social justice” marking the first time that the African-American 
community had an ally to pass their concerns on to the White House.76  While some 
historians have questioned Ms. Roosevelt’s true conviction about racial equality, no one 
can argue with the results.77  Ms. Roosevelt provided African-Americans entrance into 
the President’s mind and heart, and from that time on African-Americans would not be 
ignored by a President again.78   
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Harry S. Truman advanced the interests of African-Americans more then his 
predecessor.  Specifically, “those demographic, organizational, and political forces that 
inclined Roosevelt toward concessions to black America had, by Truman’s time, become 
even more irresistible.”79  From that time on, minority groups (such as the NAACP and 
later LULAC) held enough political power that presidents and presidential candidates 
began working with them and working to attract them.   
Increasing political power for African-Americans led to an increased power for 
Hispanics as well.80  Latino organizations, similar to the NAACP, established 
themselves as early as the 1920’s in South Texas.  Mostly created to deal with local 
issues, these organizations generally ignored politics on a national level.81 Once 
thousands of Mexican and Puerto Rican veterans returned from World War II and the 
Korean War, they believed that blatant segregation should not continue.  Historian Juan 
Gonzalez argues that this was the turning point in Hispanic’s political power: “The 
veterans not only threw themselves into organizations . . . but they also turned to politics 
and began to challenge the historic exclusion of Mexicans from the voting booth.”82  
Unfortunately, Hispanics in the Southwest faced some of the same discrimination, 
intimidation and violence that African-Americans faced in the South.83  This 
discrimination came in direct response to the advances of African-Americans, 
particularly in Texas.  As Texas legislators began to see the advances that African-
Americans were making in the South, they instituted poll taxes and other discriminatory 
measures to “counter the growth of the Populist movement among blacks, Mexicans and 
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poor whites.”84  Between 1950 and 1960 Hispanics advanced their cause in local politics, 
but did not attempt to influence national politics, until they met John F. Kennedy.85  
Kennedy attracted Latinos for several reasons: his religion, his politics and his 
running mate.  As the first modern Catholic presidential candidate, and among a 
community of more than ninety percent Catholics, Kennedy identified with Latinos in a 
way no previous candidate ever had.86  Second, Hispanics liked Kennedy’s liberal 
politics.  Kennedy’s connection to the African-American community led Latinos to 
believe that his election would lead to more freedoms for them. 87  John F. Kennedy’s 
brother and campaign manager Robert intentionally worked to foster a relationship with 
both the Hispanic and African-American communities.  This relationship led to the 
formation of Viva Kennedy clubs throughout the Southwest.88  These grassroots clubs 
fostered an excitement in the Hispanic community for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket.  
While these clubs were enormously important to the relationship between Hispanics and 
Kennedy, the relationship between Latinos and Kennedy’s running mate proved more 
pivotal.  Well-known and well liked in the Hispanic community, Senator Lyndon B. 
Johnson grew up in poor parts of rural Texas among Mexican-Americans.  He 
understood the struggles of poverty, immigration and power in Texas and had a heart for 
the plight of Mexican-Americans in particular.89  This understanding translated to a great 
deal of power during his presidency, specifically in 1964 as he dealt with foreign policy 
problems in Latin America. 
This combination of religion, politics and running mate led to an unprecedented 
amount of support for Kennedy in the Latino community.  Kennedy swept eighty-five 
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percent of the Hispanic vote nation-wide.90  Many scholars believe that Latino voters 
helped Kennedy win in 1960.91  Historians also agree that the election of Kennedy 
served as the turning point in the recognition of Latinos as a group that had political 
influence.  In the 1964 election Johnson received even more support from the Latino 
community than Kennedy received, more than ninety percent.92  From that time on 
Hispanics began to flex their political muscles, even taking on a new moniker, Chicano. 
 During the 1960‘s ‘Chicano’ became the predominant term used by Latinos.93  
This title proved important for two reasons: first, it unified the various factions of the 
Hispanic community, including Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, Californios, Tejanos, 
and the like.  Secondly, as historian José de la Isla argues, the title ‘Chicano’ “implied –
beyond ethnicity—an identity with a cause.”94  ‘Chicano’ caught the imagination of 
activists, as journalist and historian Juan Gonzalez notes, and the “radical nationalist 
period” began.  95  During this period Latinos used many of the similar strategies 
African-Americans made popular during the 1950s.  Militant groups, such as the Brown 
Berets, La Raza Unida, the Young Lords and the United Farm Workers, began to form 
and usurp power from the well-established League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC).96  These groups were prominent in “every urban barrio and Southwest farm 
community, rarely with much organizational connection.”97  Chicano activism on the 
local level finally gave rise to national activism.  
The most notable Latino activist at this time was César Chávez.  The leader of 
the United Farm Workers (UFW) organization, Chávez fought for the rights of migrant 
farm workers throughout the Southwest.  Because his parents were migrant farm 
   21 
 
workers, and moved frequently, he never finished high school, and estimated that he had 
attended more than thirty elementary schools.98  Like Martin Luther King, Jr., Chávez 
believed in non-violent resistance, specifically three forms of resistance: strikes, 
boycotts and fasting. 99 The UFW began its first strike in 1965 against Delano, California 
area grape-growers.100  The boycotts and strikes were so successful that between 1965 
and 1970 thousands of migrant workers and hundreds of thousands of supporters 
throughout the world boycotted grapes, lettuce and other vegetables.  The boycotts also 
brought attention to the work of César Chávez, and he became a national figure.101  
Chávez was most famous for his fasts.  Even in his later years, Chávez fasted for up to 
36 days at a time.  His water-only diet was not only vital to him personally, but also to 
the movement.  Chávez once stated: 
A fast is first and foremost personal.  It is a fast for the purification of my own 
body, mind, and soul.  The fast is also a heartfelt prayer for purification and 
strengthening for all those who work beside me in the farm worker movement.  
The fast is also an act of penance for those in positions of moral authority and for 
all men and women activists who know what is right and just, who know that 
they could and should do more.  The fast is finally a declaration of non-
cooperation with supermarkets who promote and sell and profit from California 
table grapes.102 
 
Chávez also fasted in response to his research on the growing use of pesticides in 
vegetables and fruit production.  In his last years, Chávez worked to educate Latinos 
about the dangers of pesticides.  Chávez’s last (and longest fast) took place in August of 
1988, on behalf of his anti-pesticide message.103  Since Chávez’s death in 1993, no other 
Hispanic leader has been able to replace his notoriety, his power in the community and 
his ability to unify all Latinos under one cause.104  Because of Chávez’s work Latinos 
emerged onto the national political scene. 
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Since the time of Chávez and UFW,  Hispanics have continued to work for more 
political power, and as the population has increased dramatically since the 1960’s, 
Latinos are finally a voting block that could make a difference in local and more 
importantly, national elections.  Even though Latino voters are more politically active 
than they were in 1960, the political strategies of Anglo politicians have not changed 
since the Kennedy election.  All subsequent elections have followed Kennedy’s model 
like a template, with only minor changes.  
Ronald Reagan recognized the importance of Latinos as a voting block during his 
1980 campaign, hiring a campaign consultant, Lionel Sosa, specifically to run a 
campaign directed at Hispanics.  Reagan felt that “Hispanics are Republicans, they just 
don’t know it.”105  Reagan argued that Latinos’ religiosity, values and family structure 
should cause them to lean Republican.106  In his September 16, 1980 speech in 
Harlingen, Texas, at a Mexican Independence Day (Deciseis de Septembre) Celebration, 
Reagan reiterated these ideas to a crowd of Hispanics:  
That heritage [of freedom and independence] is not a relic of the past, but a vital 
force in American life today.  Americans of Mexican ancestry have honored the 
values they cherish, and, in doing so, have made a significant contribution to the 
growth of our nation.  You have preserved the fundamental values of the 
Hispanic community--not merely the immediate family, but the extended family 
linking the generations. . . .  Strong ties of language, religion, culture, and family 
combine to build communities of shared values, communities organized for 
public service--for better housing, for improved education, for recreational 
opportunities, for activities that enrich life on the small, human scale where 
people live their everyday lives.107 
 
Since 1980, Reagan’s view of Latinos has been proven correct.  As Lionel Sosa, 
who designs political campaigns for Republican candidates (and has since 1980) 
explained after the 2000 election, “[The Hispanic] vote will not remain in the 
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Democrats’ column in the future.  It is a vote that Republicans can attract consistently by 
doing the right things, and that is inviting them, involving them, and connecting with 
them.”108 However, this connection must be covert; Latinos do not like to be converted 
to a party affiliation.  As Roberto Suro director of the Pew Hispanic Center has 
concluded, ultimately Latinos would rather vote for a candidate they know, rather than a 
party.109  Politicians struggle with Latinos’ lack of party affiliation when reaching out to 
them.  Democrats struggle with continuing Latino support because of the morals and 
values of the Hispanic Community.110  These distinct value differences have led many 
Hispanics over the years to move slowly into the Republican Party. 
Republicans have made more of an effort to reach out to Latinos.  Whereas many 
Hispanics felt a connection to the Democratic Party because of their political views and 
the connection to Catholic President John F. Kennedy, the Republican Party has worked 
since 1980 to reach out to Hispanics.111  After decades of ambivalence, the sudden 
attention being paid to Hispanics by Republicans is confusing, it makes them unsure 
how to vote, as reflected in conflicting polling data.112  The messages that Democrats 
have been sending for decades have worked; Hispanics have been called to the party and 
to the polls for Democratic candidates.  However, lately, Republicans have figured out 
how to reach Hispanics too.   
By evaluating the reality created by presidential campaign rhetoric, specifically 
by looking closely at narratives and the use of the American Dream story, we will be 
able to discover what messages have the potential to woo Hispanics, and to keep their 
attention through Election Day.  Understanding the characteristics of a group that is 
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simultaneously connected and disconnected from the norm is key to understanding how 
to stir their political passion. 
Methodology 
A rhetor’s power is his or her ability to create a common language among the 
audience, one that becomes second nature to the audience.  This language communicates 
an understanding between the rhetor and his or her audience.  During the 1960 election, 
Robert Kennedy created “Viva Kennedy” campaigns throughout the Southwest and New 
York for his brother.113  The language used during that campaign was so powerful, and 
became such a part of the Latino political language that there have been Viva Johnson, 
Viva Nixon, Viva Bush, Viva Kerry, Viva Carter and Viva Clinton campaigns that have 
all been successful parts of the Latino community’s political strategy.   
The first political advertisement for President directed at the Latino community 
was a television ad featuring Jacqueline Kennedy in 1960.  In the ad she discussed the 
importance of stopping communism, helping the poor, creating safer schools and better 
medical care for the elderly, all in Spanish.  The ad was directed at the Puerto Rican 
community in New York, and only ran in the city.114  In the advertisement, Ms. Kennedy 
refers to her husband as a person who “cares for the interests of Hispanics in New 
York.”115  By using his wife in a Spanish-speaking advertisement, Kennedy was creating 
a narrative relationship with the Hispanic audience, by sharing their value of family and 
putting his family at the forefront of the campaign.  This language was successful, 
because Latinos felt an affinity to the candidate.  Kennedy wanted to revolutionize the 
government, and Latinos wanted to be a part of that change.116  Kennedy was the first 
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political candidate to create advertising in Spanish, which galvanized Latinos who were 
watching his campaign.117  The ad and its message were simple, but the importance to 
Latinos and their collective story was immeasurable.  
Identifying a specific methodology in a case like this is difficult.  As a 
researcher, it is important to get a representative and manageable sample of the 
discursive tools used by Presidential candidates toward the Latino community. I believe 
in a narrative approach in the methodology, focusing on the dominant rhetorical forms in 
the political discourse aimed at Hispanics:  specifically related to the idea of myths. It is 
not possible to evaluate every word uttered in a presidential campaign toward the Latino 
community because those kinds of records do not exist. Celeste Michelle Condit 
explains, “. . . [S]ince most public speech is never recorded, it is too ephemeral to allow 
that kind of completeness.”118   
Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, I will evaluate available official 
campaign speeches and campaign ads from general Presidential campaigns from 1992-
2000 that are clearly directed at Latinos, either through language or location.119  These 
speeches and ads come from several sources: the largest source of my data comes from 
the University of Pennsylvania-Annenberg School for Communication’s Archive of 
Presidential Campaign Discourse, the second source is the University of Oklahoma’s 
Presidential Campaign archive.  Unfortunately, these databases are not complete; many 
speeches are missing from these sources.  Therefore, in an effort to gain an 
understanding of the entire election I will supplement these sources with media reports 
of the presidential campaign events.  This information allows me to get a deeper 
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understanding of the rhetorical situation.  Media reports include a description of the 
audience and their reactions, as well as meaningful information from the campaign trail.  
I will further redefine my artifacts by including only those speeches and ads that are 
clearly directed at the Latino community: this will include speeches and ads in Spanish, 
or delivered (or aired) in areas where Hispanics are geographically centralized.  This will 
provide a clear, but still rich set of artifacts to criticize.120  Narratives play an important 
role in campaign ads. 
Narratives 
Narratives have been an important part of the campaign process, whether through 
candidates telling their personal stories or using “average people” to tell stories about the 
candidate.  Rhetorician Walter Fisher argues that human communication is narrative, and 
that humans are innate storytellers.  This is a simple idea, but the consequences are 
important. Fisher questions the idea that humans are rational in Aristotelian terms, or in 
some way make decisions based on the strict rules of syllogisms and enthymemes. He 
argues that people are persuaded by stories (accounts of experience), and that they are 
able to innately understand the logic of such narratives.121  Humans use two tools to 
evaluate the truth of a story, according to Fisher, narrative fidelity and narrative 
probability.  Narrative fidelity describes the consistency between the rhetor’s message 
and the audience’s values.  When a narrative does not make sense with the audience’s 
values, they will reject it.  Narrative probability explains the internal consistency of a 
story.122   
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Narratives take many different forms as a narrative is any account of experience. 
Fisher sees narrative as a metaphor for all of human communication. Therefore, a myth, 
a metaphor, a joke, or a strategy has the potential to convey a truth, just like all other 
narratives.123  Another form of narrative is an anecdote.  Anecdotes are the simple stories 
that people tell, the simplicity of the message is the key to its rhetorical power.  An 
anecdote can be about anything, its importance is in its ability to convey common sense 
truths and values.  William F. Lewis explains, “Anecdotes are the quick stories, jokes, or 
incidents that are the verbal counterpart of the visual image.  The anecdote is intended to 
spark interest, and its meaning is established in reference to some larger frame of 
understanding that is either specified within a discourse or assumed in an audience.”124  
Regardless of what form it takes, narratives have persuasive power because of their 
ability to convey values to the audience.  
All narratives communicate specific values, whether or not the audience is aware 
of the message.  As Hayden White asserts, “Where, in any account of reality, narrativity 
is present, we can be sure that morality or a moral impulse is present too.”125  Every 
narrative is imbedded with morality or narrative truth.  Not all stories are true, but all 
stories have some level of truth, according to Lewis, “If the story is not true, it must be 
true-to-life; if it did not actually happen, it must be evident that it could have happened 
or that, given the way things are, it should have happened.”126  Narrative truth either 
conveys the truth, or helps to give meaning to a misunderstood world.127  Often times, 
especially in political rhetoric, the truth may change based on the author.  For example, 
when Clinton is evaluating the reasons for the implementation of trickle-down 
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economics he is going to have a different explanation than Ronald Reagan would.  
Clinton’s version of the story is going to differ based on his different values and on his 
audience’s values.   
In that sense, narrative truth is in the author’s mind, “Has any historical narrative ever 
been written that was not informed not only by moral awareness by specifically by the 
moral authority of the narrator?”128  The key is to persuade the audience to agree with 
the narrator’s values. Being able to ‘relate’ to the author can be based on several 
variables: the speaker’s credibility, the context of the speech, the willingness of the 
audience or “the logic of good reasons,” all of these components work together to create 
persuasion.129  
Narrative theory argues that all texts can be evaluated for their good reasons.  As 
Walt Fisher argues, “texts are viewed as verbal phenomena composed of good reasons as 
elements that function as warrants for believing or acting in accord with the message of 
the text.”130  Each good reason contains different components, and can have different 
mediums, but ultimately the “good reasons” give narratives their persuasive power. 
Fisher gave critics two tests to measure a text’s effectiveness, or narrative rationality: 
narrative probability and narrative fidelity.131  Essentially all stories have natural 
storylines that are expected by the audience, and a story that violates that norm would 
not have narrative probability. For example, in American culture all fairy tales begin 
“Once upon a time” and end with “and they lived happily ever after,” anything else 
would violate our expectations, and would automatically be incoherent.  Narrative 
fidelity is external consistency of the story with the audience’s values or the 
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“truthfulness of a story,” which Fisher argues is based on the “logic of good reasons.”132  
Good reasons can be evaluated based on argumentation theory, but ultimately reside in 
the mind of the audience.  Good reason is “those elements that provide warrants for 
accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication that can be 
considered rhetorical.”133  Good reasons require warrants; they justify, authorize, and 
sanction changes in belief, attitudes or actions.  Nevertheless, Fisher is quick to point out 
that the usefulness of warrants depends on the audience and their values, “whatever is 
taken as a basis for adopting a rhetorical message is inextricably bound to a value—to a 
conception of the good.”134  The warrant is based in the audience’s perceptions of truth.  
This definition opens up the field of possible texts, no longer is narrative bound solely to 
stories, but to any utterance that conveys a message; like presidential campaign rhetoric.  
At the core of every narrative are several components: characters, setting or 
scene, and the moral of the story.  Much like Kenneth Burke’s pentad (act, scene, agent, 
agency, purpose) these components help a critic to understand the message of the 
narrative.135  “I believe that texts, whatever their subjects, times, places, or cultural 
contexts, can be characterized as expressing one or more of four, perhaps five, 
motives”136 Fisher defines motives like Burke does, “it is a name that characterizes the 
nature of a symbolic action in a given situation.”137  This is the key to the methodology 
of this dissertation; I will be evaluating the characters, scene and moral of each 
candidate’s story. There are many different stories that are part of American culture; 
however, one of the most powerful story is the American Dream.  
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The American Dream 
The American Dream is an iconic part of the American life.  Millions have come 
to America in order to seek this dream of freedom and materialistic success.  Native-
born Americans have used the dream as a justification for continuing to work on failed 
ventures.  Everyone defines the Dream differently, but ultimately it comes down to one 
word: success.138  The phrase “The American Dream” can be traced back to 1930’s 
historian James Truslow Adams in his 1931 book The Epic of America, where he defines 
the term as the “dream of a better, richer and happier life for all our citizens of every 
rank . . . each generation has seen an uprising of ordinary Americans to save that dream 
from the forces which appeared to be overwhelming it.”139  Adams saw the desire for a 
better, richer, happier life as the struggle of the century, “ [the struggle] of the ordinary 
man [sic] to hold fast to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, which were 
vouchsafed to us in the past in vision and on parchment.”140  Even though the term does 
not appear in print until well into the 20th century, the Pilgrims understood the concept 
when they landed in the new world.141 
There are many different versions of the American Dream, but there are 
essentially two major themes: “There is the materialistic myth of individual success and 
the moralistic myth of brotherhood.”142   These dual dreams work in concert and in 
contrast. At their most basic, they are competing dreams. One is based on individualism 
and “the right to get rich,” the other on compassion, equality and the importance of 
work.143  The materialism of the first seems to directly violate the egalitarian values of 
the second.144  But, these two dreams are two sides of the same indefinable idea:  
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success.  “A definition of success involves measurement as well as content.”145   Each 
person has a different definition of success, but success is still the major tenet of any 
definition of the American Dream.   
Clinton sought to connect with Latinos by using the myth of the American 
Dream.  Myths, much like narratives, help an audience to understand their chaotic world.  
As Walt Fisher explained, “Myths are vehicles of communication . . . their functions are 
to provide meaning, identify and a comprehensive understandable image of the world, 
and to support the social order.”146  In the case of presidential rhetoric, narratives and 
myths function in much the same way; they communicate truths.  However, myths are 
powerful because they follow a plotline, usually a well-known story, which gives order 
to the audience's world.  “The story fulfills all the requirements of myth—it is widely 
believed, generally unquestioned, and clearly pedagogical.”147  The American Dream is 
a perfect example of a modern myth.  
The rags to riches story of individual success is the basis for the materialistic 
myth: “For hundreds of years, American readers and writers have had tireless appetites 
for tales of poor boys who, with nothing but pluck and ingenuity, created financial 
empires.”148  This is the version most natural-born citizens aspire to, the dream of 
wealth, fame or simply a better life. As journalist Dan Rather explains, “I could feel its 
truth in my father’s tireless drive to build a better life for himself and his family and in 
my mother’s determination to make the best of what we already had.”149  The 
materialistic myth is grounded in a deep belief in the importance of work, and 
persistence.  
   32 
 
The second myth is the myth of brotherhood, which is based in the renowned 
words of Thomas Jefferson from the Declaration of Independence, “all men are created 
equal, and they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness [sic].”150  This moralistic myth 
implies values like equality, tolerance, charity and compassion for all.151  These two 
facets of the American Dream are at the core of Clinton’s campaign message. 
The American Dream has played a part in political rhetoric for many generations.  
It is a story, or narrative, that politicians tell to make sense of the world, “In narrative 
application, [the American Dream] becomes a plot artfully used to account for one’s 
experience and life trajectory.”152  Previous researchers have focused on how presidents, 
like Ronald Reagan, have used the American Dream story to spur Americans to continue 
working toward the rewards the Dream offers.  Communication theorist G. Thomas 
Goodnight argued that Reagan was able to use the American Dream imagery to distract 
Americans from many of the economic problems during his Administration, and instead 
focus on their hard work.  Goodnight says, “Reagan’s rhetoric succeeds not by virtue of 
its request to simplify or forget the particulars of American history. . . .  Rather, it 
succeeds because the Dream releases family members from pain of loss caused by the 
economic displacements, change and scattering over which there could be scant 
control.”153  This strategy exonerated Reagan from the blame for his downfalls, and laid 
the responsibility of their own success in the hands of average Americans.  
 Successful political candidates, such as Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have 
also been able to use the American Dream to remind Americans of the importance of 
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believing in this nation’s promise.  Clinton used his own story of a poor upbringing and 
his eventual success to recall the importance of believing in the Dream.  He told 
Americans that the Dream was possible again, and used himself as the hero of that story.  
George W. Bush held up his own family as an example of the power of the American 
Dream.  Despite the family’s wealth and legacy in politics, George W. Bush used his 
half-Mexican nephew as an example of the American Dream.  Bush essentially argued 
that the Dream was available to everyone, and that his nephew was the embodiment of 
that Dream.  However, the American Dream has persuasive power over more than just 
American citizens, immigrants also see the American Dream as their key to success.  
Over the years a subset of the Dream has developed, historian Jim Cullen calls it the 
Dream of the Immigrant. 
 The Dream of the Immigrant 
  Of the millions of immigrants who have crossed American borders to find 
freedom and prosperity there is a common story that unites them.  Jim Cullen, in his 
book The American Dream, argues that the Dream of the Immigrant unifies all 
immigrant communities together, and is constantly in flux based on the new immigrants 
who are coming to America.  Cullen describes immigration as stretching the American 
Dream, “not always comfortably.”154  It is difficult to describe exactly what the Dream 
of the Immigrant is because it is constantly changing.  “So the saga of the Dream of the 
Immigrant is far from over.  Indeed, it seems anything but static.  Once the hopes and 
anxieties surrounded the Irish and Germans; then it was the Italians and Japanese.  Now 
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it’s the Arabs and Mexicans.”155  The faces change, and with those different faces come 
different interpretations of the Dream of the Immigrant.   
There is no precise script for the Dream of the Immigrant but it has similar 
characteristics for all, “a story where hard work pays off and aspirations are realized.  
And a story where the principals speak of their adopted land with accents of love and 
loyalty.”156 The American Dream is poignant for Latinos in particular. Regardless of 
whether they are first- second- or third- generation immigrants, Latinos understand that 
people have moved and died for the American Dream, this is the story they share. Since 
the birth of the nation, that idea of advancement spread from the Colonists to outsiders, 
such as immigrants.  During the Industrial Period, this idea was most obvious in the 
number of immigrants who fled to the United States, the land of opportunity.  According 
to Cullen, because of the nature of American multiculturalism the American Dream is 
accessible to all; only allegiance to America and its ideals are necessary to take part in 
the Dream.157   Each culture has its own elements of the Dream, Latinos in particular. 
Narratives in Latino Culture 
  The written word is an extremely important part of Latino culture. In their 1994 
article “Ethnic Heritage as Rhetorical Legacy,” John C. Hammerback and Richard J. 
Jensen discuss the power of written “plans” or “proclamations” in the history of 
Mexican-Americans.  These declarations became a form of rhetorical identity, and 
created narratives for the people to believe. During the 1800’s, Mexican dissenters 
would use written proclamations to communicate with their collaborators during their 
fight for independence from Spain.  Named after the cities in which they were penned, 
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these declarations were usually less than a page in length, and were copied by mobile 
printing presses throughout the region.158  The most decisive proclamation was “El Plan 
de Iguala” which was issued by Colonel Augustín de Iturbide in 1821.  The Plan 
outlined twenty-four articles detailing the revolutionary actions needed for 
independence.  It also reinforced the importance of a Roman Catholic nation that 
“guaranteed a close union of Americans and Europeans,” the residents of “New 
Spain.”159  Understanding the power of the “Plan of Iguala” is vital to understanding the 
history of declarations in Mexico.  After the Plan was released on February 24, 1821, it 
quickly found its way into the minds and hearts of Mexicans: “As if by magic, the Plan 
of Iguala appeared on billboards in plazas of towns all over Mexico, and citizens, in 
defiance of the law, gathered in groups to argue its merits.”160  Within a few years, more 
‘plans’ began to appear in Mexico, and all of them followed the same basic model of the 
Iguala.  They exemplified the ideals of the movement, and always had a signature (or set 
of signatures) to back up the credibility of the plan through its authors.161  César Chávez 
made powerful use of declarations during the 1960’s and 1970’s, his writings continue to 
influence Latinos today.  During that time, Chávez created powerful narratives through 
his plans, including the importance of education and economic prosperity; both key 
components of the American Dream.  
Chávez’s most important rhetoric was not spoken, but written, in “The Plan of 
Delano,” which has become a model of Hispanic narratives.162  Written to win support 
for the crop pickers union (United Farm Workers) that Chávez represented, the “Plan” 
became a rallying cry for all Latinos.  Not only did Chávez author and sign the “Plan,” 
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but also he publicly read it nightly during his famous 1966 march from Delano to 
Sacramento.163  The struggle for equality and economic freedom also galvanized the 
Latino community, especially around this important document.  Poor Hispanics across 
the Southwest read the “Plan” at political rallies; it was often the most exciting part of 
the event.164  The Plan of Delano was invaluable as it had the ability to persuade all 
Hispanics, not just Mexican-Americans and the poor; it had a “startling effect on the 
Mexican Americans in the cities: they began to rethink their self definition as second-
class citizens and to redefine themselves as Chicanos.”165  Historians and rhetorical 
critics have argued that the “Plan of Delano” was the most important piece of 
revolutionary rhetoric from the Latino movement, and in the minds of Mexican-
Americans across the country, the “Plan of Delano” is legendary as the start of the 
revolution, that continues.166 
 The “Plan of Delano” is important to this discussion because Chávez created a 
document that outlined six important Hispanic values.  These values are indicative of the 
truths that Latinos see in the American Dream.   In the “Plan of Delano” Chávez 
explained the importance of each value, and then concluded with a slogan.  First, Chávez 
argued that the “Plan of Delano” created a new social movement that would give justice 
to the oppressed, which is a God-given right.  Chávez concluded, “To respect the rights 
of others is peace.”  The second idea is a clear distrust for the government.  Chávez and 
his followers felt they had been abandoned by their legislators, that they did not trust 
lawmakers to listen to their concerns or to help them seek justice.  Therefore, a change in 
the government was important to the movement, “We shall be heard.”  Third, Chávez 
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reinforced the Latino movement’s close connection to the Roman Catholic Church, an 
association that Chávez (a devout Catholic) encouraged.  “We seek, and have, the 
support of the Church in what we do.”  Chávez also mentioned the Jewish faith: “we also 
carry the Star of David . . . because we ask the help and prayers of all religions.”  He 
concluded, “God shall not abandon us.”  Fourth, Chávez repeated the mantra that so 
many other civil rights groups have used, “We shall endure.” Chávez noted the 
suffering, the injustice and the fact that his supporters will continue to suffer, “with hope 
that our children will not be exploited as we have been.”  Just like the Chicano poets 
who were his contemporaries, Chávez reiterated the importance of suffering for the 
cause (la causa).  The fifth idea connected all civil rights groups from the same time, 
“United we shall stand.”  Chávez connected his fight to the struggle of poor whites, 
Filipinos, Blacks, Japanese-Americans and Muslims, arguing that all minorities in the 
U.S. must band together to defeat the discriminatory system.  Finally, Chávez gave his 
audience this pledge, “We are sons of the Mexican Revolution, a revolution of the poor 
seeking bread and justice. Our revolution will not be armed, but we want the existing 
social order to dissolve, we want a new social order.”167  Borrowing from his friend 
Martin Luther King Jr., Chávez ended, “We shall overcome.” The “Plan of Delano” set 
the mood for the Hispanic movement, and it has continued to be powerful even today.168  
Chávez’s call for justice, economic prosperity and equality, hope for the future, the 
power of the Church, the power of suffering, the importance of unity and the power of 
perseverance reverberate in the messages used by presidential candidates from 1992 
until 2000.   
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Research Questions  
This research will answer one important research question.  How does the 
American Dream, as defined by the “Plan of Delano,” play into successful campaigns 
toward Latinos?  That is, what parts of the American Dream narrative are compelling to 
Latinos, and how can utilizing those parts lead to a more successful campaign?  I will 
accomplish this objective through two means: first, I will evaluate the various parts of 
the American Dream myth, looking specifically at the characters and settings used in the 
candidate’s narrative.  Then, I will evaluate the values in those narratives through the 
lens of the Plan of Delano.  Specifically looking for ways these candidates actually 
reinforced important Latino values, as designated by César Chávez. Because each 
election provided a unique set of rhetorical exigencies, I will evaluate each election 
separately.   
Chapter II will discuss the 1992 election, between George H.W. Bush and Gov. 
Bill Clinton, which was heavily influenced by the narrative of a poor boy from Hope, 
Arkansas who became a successful example of the American Dream. Clinton created a 
connection with Latinos by using narratives that showed how he understood the plight of 
the impoverished in America.  This connection allowed Latinos to feel that Clinton felt 
their pain.169  Then in Chapter III, I will discuss the 1996 election between incumbent 
President Bill Clinton and challenger Senator Bob Dole.  In this election the issue of 
immigration became such a powerful tool that Latinos were quickly brought into the 
election.  However, one party continued to offend them by arguing that immigrant’s 
access to the American Dream should be limited; whereas, the other party opened up and 
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spoke instead about the importance of equal opportunity for all.  The striking difference 
between these two narratives made the election extremely powerful for Latinos—and 
branded one party as “anti-immigrant” for a generation.  Then in Chapter IV, I will 
discuss how rhetorically George W. Bush was able to repair the damage between the 
GOP and Latinos, by using his Latino family members to create a connection with 
Hispanics.  With the help of family Bush was eventually able to repair the rift that had 
been created during the 1996 election, a feat that many thought was impossible. Chapter 

































 Arkansas governor Bill Clinton faced difficult challenges when he announced his 
intent to run for the presidency on October 3, 1991.  Being the lesser-known governor of 
one of the smaller states was not exactly the résumé Americans were looking for, yet the 
Democratic faithful encouraged him to run as early as 1988.  Clinton’s centrist politics 
and his gift for campaigning made him an attractive alternative to the other Democratic 
candidates.1 Unfortunately, even before he announced his candidacy, rumors about 
sexual harassment and infidelity in the Arkansas Governor’s mansion surfaced in the 
media.2  Clinton also faced other challenges: his wife Hillary, a successful lawyer in her 
own right, appeared the antithesis of the ‘First Lady’ image that America had come to 
expect from Nancy Reagan, Rossalyn Carter and Barbara Bush.3  Clinton admitted in his 
autobiography that he had serious concerns about running for the Presidency: concerns 
for his family, his home state and his reputation.4  Nevertheless, he agreed to run.  
 Governor Clinton gained support quickly from many of the Democratic faithful.  
Already a supporter of civil rights and an open admirer of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Clinton brought the support of minority groups (specifically African-Americans) with 
him during the 1992 campaign.  Clinton had a well-known history as a civil rights 
activist in his youth, having worked to stop racism in Arkansas during its ugliest days.5 
Ironically, once he entered the race, his campaign focused less on his overt ties to 
the African-American community and more on his commonalities with mainstream 
voters.  Other than the occasional speech in a predominately African-American church, 
   41 
 
Clinton no longer put minorities in the forefront of his campaign.6 While there is no way 
to measure how this affected his national image, it did cause minorities to question his 
commitment to their issues.7  National Hispanic groups, such as La Raza and LULAC, 
criticized Clinton.8  Their concern stemmed from the lack of Latino insiders on the 
campaign staff and they were concerned that Clinton was focusing on Latinos for 
opportunistic reasons, not out of a true commitment to their issues.   
Despite discussions about the importance of Latino voters and several notable 
appearances at Hispanic conventions and events, Clinton did not hire many Hispanics.  
From the beginning of his campaign, Clinton utilized one main Latino confidante: Henry 
Cisneros.  At the time Clinton spoke to the LULAC national convention in July 1992, 
many had speculated that Cisneros might become the Governor’s choice for a running 
mate.  Organizers made that sentiment clear to Clinton while he was on stage during the 
event.9  By the time the Democratic National Convention (DNC) arrived, Clinton chose 
Al Gore; some Hispanic organizations began to lose faith in the Democratic ticket, and 
that distrust grew during the 1992 Democratic National Convention (DNC).10  During 
the DNC convention, Clinton’s staff told Latino delegates to keep their comments and 
focus on Clinton, not on “special interest politics.”11   
The campaign’s request for unity worked for the convention, but once the 
convention ended Latino groups continued to question Clinton’s commitment to Latino 
issues.  National organizations like La Raza and LULAC listed several concerns, 
including Clinton’s commitment to Latinos and the number of Latinos representatives on 
his staff.  José Villareal, deputy campaign manager, dealt with most of the criticism, and 
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began to hire more Latinos in power positions.  However, when Clinton supporter 
Representative Bill Richardson (D-NM) appeared on the Spanish network Televisa, he 
stirred more criticism.  Richardson told viewers that Latinos should be patient with 
Governor Clinton because he had not grown up around Latinos, and was unaccustomed 
to dealing with their issues.12  This caused a backlash amongst some Latino 
organizations who had heard those type of excuses before from both parties, and did not 
want to wait.  Despite this controversy, Clinton’s ultimate ability to identify with the 
Hispanic voting public led to their support of his campaign, the Latino groups were 
unable to discredit him.   
In the 1992 election, Clinton’s campaign rhetoric painted him as a man who 
understood poverty, and the plight of the working class in America.  In this chapter I will 
evaluate how the rhetorical situation in 1992 affected Clinton’s narrative, specifically, 
Clinton’s values on equality of opportunity and the materialistic myth of the American 
Dream.  Then I will discuss the various ways that Clinton characterized himself as a hero 
of the American Dream myth—he connected himself to John F. Kennedy, a person that 
Latinos emulate.  Then I will assess the various scenes Clinton used to explain the plight 
of modern America.  In doing so, he was able to communicate a hopeful message by the 
way he described America. Finally, Clinton’s rhetoric conveyed values that 
corresponded with Latinos’ values (as described in the “Plan of Delano”) which 
connected with his audience. These values are part of the Latino interpretation of the 
American Dream, and help us to understand how parts of the Dream connected to 
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Latinos.  This persuaded not only the Anglo audience, but also the Latino audience to 
support him.     
The Rhetorical Situation in 1992 
President George H.W. Bush faced many difficulties in his efforts to be re-
elected in 1992: the economy had not yet fully rebounded from a recession, and 
President Bush’s most prominent issue—foreign policy—had lost its persuasive power 
after the fall of communism.13  Despite what appeared to be an early lead, Bush quickly 
lost ground to billionaire Ross Perot, Republican rival Patrick Buchanan, and ultimately 
lost to Arkansas governor William Jefferson Clinton.  This loss occurred for many 
reasons; however, one interesting feature was the Hispanic turnout for Governor Clinton.  
During the 1992 election, Governor Clinton separated President Bush from a 
faithful group of Latino supporters.  President Bush had a good rapport with the Latino 
community. During the 1988 election, Bush made ample use of his Mexican daughter-
in-law, Colomba, and his “brown grandchildren.”14  Bush, who was from Texas, always 
worked closely with Latinos and had learned the importance of their political power 
from President Reagan.  During his time in the White House, Bush advocated for many 
of the issues that mattered to Latinos.15  However, because of Governor Clinton’s use of 
narrative, he separated Bush from his small (but strong) Latino following by tapping 
into their feelings of discontent and discrimination. What the public remembers from 
the 1992 election is Clinton’s simple slogan, “It’s the Economy Stupid,” and 
unfortunately, for Bush, it was.  During the end of Desert Storm, the United States 
entered a recession.  By November 1992, the economy was growing; however, the 
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American public did not forget the economic downturn.16  Governor Clinton played on 
the fear of another economic decline, and by appearing like a “New Democrat” with 
frequent references to building bridges, universal healthcare and the importance of 
education, he created an image reminiscent of John F. Kennedy’s “Camelot” 
optimism.17  The 1960 Election, Kennedy’s election, played an important part in the 
collective history of Latino political success.  By sharing in this history, Clinton 
connected with his audience on a pre-rhetorical level, before they even knew they were 
part of a conversation, which made the Latino community much more receptive to 
Clinton as a candidate.18  
It’s about the Economy, Stupid! 
Hispanic researcher, Geoffrey Fox, argues that the only way for a candidate 
(whether Anglo or Latino) to have any credibility with Hispanic voters is to defend the 
rights of the working poor.19  Many Hispanics are part of this group, and even those that 
are more affluent can identify with the working class.20  This idea allowed Clinton to 
break through the criticism he received from the Hispanic bureaucracy, and reach 
individual Latino voters.21  Clinton was able to explain his understanding of the working 
poor, by telling the story of a poor American family: his family. 
This was the power of Clinton's rhetoric, he helped Latinos to remember their 
past, learn from their present and dream of their future.  “Without dreams or myths, a 
man [sic] or nation is without a past, present, or future.”22 Clinton used narrative to 
define two specific parts of the myth of the American Dream: the characters and the 
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settings. Clinton’s rhetoric created a specific version of the American Dream, which 
might be stated in this way: 
America is a nation where a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas or the barrios of 
Texas can someday be president. When I was a kid I had hope that I would someday be 
someone important, and after meeting President Kennedy, I knew God had chosen me to 
lead this country. During the last twelve years, so many people I know have been hurt by 
the economics of the previous presidents, they haven’t let you accomplish the Dream. 
But, it doesn’t have to be that way. The American Dream is real, I know, I live it. Vote 
for me, I will help you live it too. 
 
In this version of the myth Clinton was the star of the American Dream. The 
American Dream was a powerful influence that made Clinton who he became, the 
Dream acted in his life as many Latinos hoped it would act in theirs. He used his 
personal story to spur others to work toward the Dream. Clinton was also deeply 
connected to John Kennedy, who he met as a teenager, because Clinton felt that meeting 
Kennedy was a pivotal point in his life.  
Clinton used several different settings during his 1992 campaign, these scenes 
were not random, they helped to make his message persuasive. First, he used his 
hometown, Hope, as the backdrop to tell his version of the American Dream.  Second, he 
visited the barrios of Texas and used them as setting for his message. Going into the 
barrios is an important concept for Latinos, because the barrios (or neighborhoods) are 
representative of the heart of Latino culture. When Clinton told the American Dream in 
the setting of the barrios, he spoke directly into the heart of the Latino community. 
Third, Clinton took full advantage of the 1991 recession as the scene.23  Clinton’s main 
campaign theme was a critique of Reaganomics and the trickle-down economy. In all of 
Clinton's narratives he told the story of Americans who had been hurt during the 
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recession, and that became the key setting of his campaign. He used these parts of the 
story (characters, settings) to communicate values about the state of the nation. 
The Hero 
Clinton as the Star 
Clinton’s anecdote about how a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas can meet the 
President, and then some day run for president, communicated the power of the 
American Dream.  Clinton was the perfect character to embody this dream.  Clinton 
even looked the part: with his chubby cheeks, ruddy complexion and down home charm.  
He was the classic image of a poor kid from the Deep South, who made something of 
himself with hard work and gumption.  As Clinton himself describes in his 
autobiography, “I thought I could make it [in politics] without family wealth or 
connections . . . Of course it was improbable, but isn’t that what America is all about?”24 
This message could have been persuasive to any American, but Latinos were especially 
interested, because they understand a life of poverty and the desire for success.  No one 
represented those American values more than a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas, who 
once had a brush with greatness.  
In the very first ad run by the Clinton campaign, “Hope,” Clinton describes his 
birth, “I was born in a little town called Hope, Arkansas, three months after my father 
died.  I remember that old two-story house where I lived with my grandparents.  They 
had very limited incomes.”25  This advertisement and other campaign material also 
explain, in detail, how poverty affected Clinton in all of his big decisions. Just as so 
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many people who live in poverty have to make tough sacrifices to support their families, 
Clinton had to make sacrifices to make a life for himself.   
As he describes in the “Hope” ad, “I worked my way through law school with 
part time jobs — anything I could find.  After I graduated I really didn’t care about 
making a lot of money.  I just wanted to go home and see if I could make a difference.”26  
Clinton is painted himself as a character that is defined by his family’s poverty, but he 
was able to transcend the poverty.  He went to law school, and paid for it by working 
lots of jobs, only to come back and give to others who live in poverty. Clinton’s official 
biography described how poverty affected his family’s choices, “Needing to find a way 
to support herself and her new child, Bill Clinton's mother, Virginia Cassidy Blythe, 
moved to New Orleans, Louisiana, to study nursing,” which led to Clinton living with 
his grandparents.27  One can only imagine how difficult it would have been for Virginia 
Blythe to leave her young son with her parents. But, if she wanted to have a better life 
for herself and her child, she needed to go, so she did.  This is a choice that many poor 
people must make, to choose to pursue an education or a job, to provide for their family. 
This would have been a story that poor people, like Latinos, would understand. The story 
had narrative fidelity to them; they would have made the same choice in the same 
situation.  
Clinton’s choices about education were also affected by money: “Bill Clinton 
recognized that although college would be expensive, it would give him the education he 
needed to accomplish his goals.”28  This explains the view that so many immigrants have 
of the American Dream. The Dream is about education, education is the vehicle by 
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which one can achieve greatness. Clinton knew that, and as the star of the story, he made 
the right choice to pursue an education. All of these stories together create an image of 
Bill Clinton, as a character whose every decision was affected by his family’s poverty.   
This led not only to empathy, but also a level of credibility in the eyes of Latinos, 
who also struggle with many of the same choices Clinton had to make and who hope for 
the kind of success Clinton had later in his life.  The story of Clinton’s upbringing and 
tough sacrifices had narrative fidelity for the Latino audience, because they too had 
made those same choices.  And Clinton’s success had narrative probability for this 
audience, because they believed that only in America is that type of success possible.  
Clinton’s version of the story of his upbringing and the potential of the American Dream 
pervades all of his rhetoric, but he tells the story most clearly when he wants to inspire 
others who struggle with poverty, like Latinos. 
Clinton as John F. Kennedy 
The 1960 election proved an important turning point in the history of Latinos as a 
political powerhouse.  Prior to this election, Hispanics had been campaigning in local 
elections about local issues, but when Robert F. Kennedy reached out to garner support 
for his brother, this community quickly accepted the invitation.  John F. Kennedy 
became a hero, of sorts, joining Latinos in their fight for equality, and recognition.  This 
indelible relationship has been the basis for many political campaigns, and has led to a 
close bond that has never been broken. 
Several factors explain the John F. Kennedy/Latino connection.  Kennedy was 
Catholic, a religion that a majority of Hispanics shared.29  As the first Catholic 
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presidential candidate, Kennedy’s opponents forced him to defend his religion.  
Opponents argued that President Kennedy would allow the Vatican to make decisions 
for the American government.  However, in several different speeches, most notably the 
Houston Ministerial Address on September 12th, 1960, Kennedy answered this criticism.  
“I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute,” Kennedy 
announced, “where no Catholic prelate would tell the president, should he be Catholic, 
how to act . . .”30  Kennedy made clear his intention to keep the Vatican out of American 
governing, regardless of his religious loyalty to the Pope.  Because his religion was 
under attack during the election, the Latino Catholic population empathized with the 
religious persecution that Kennedy faced, and were sympathetic to his plight.31   
 Hispanics also feel that much of the credit for Kennedy’s ascension to the 
presidency rested with them.  The 1960 election is the first presidential election that 
Latinos were intimately involved in, and therefore they feel closely connected to it.32  
During the election campaign, Robert Kennedy, John Kennedy’s brother and campaign 
manager, reached out to the Latino population through Viva Kennedy clubs and 
advertising in Spanish.33  The connection between Hispanics and Kennedy extended to 
his election, with eighty-five percent of registered Latino voters supporting him.34  This 
connection has continued even to present times.   
Many Hispanics still view Kennedy as the first “Hispanic” president, and others 
consider him the greatest president this nation ever had.  In Latino cultural history, 
Kennedy is iconic—he is a hero.  It is common to see pictures of President Kennedy, 
along with the Virgin of Guadalupe and deceased family members, at the home shrines 
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of traditional Latino families.35  In a sense, Kennedy’s 1960 victory has become a part of 
the Hispanic identity, as many feel they contributed to his victory and felt a close 
connection to him during his Presidency.  However, Kennedy’s election was ultimately 
important because it proved the political power Latinos held, which made it an important 
part of the collective history of Hispanics.  
Bill Clinton met John F. Kennedy in 1963. Clinton represented Arkansas in the 
Boys Nation Program, and visited Washington D.C. as part of the program. President 
Kennedy met with the boys on the South Lawn of the White House. There are two 
pictures of Kennedy and Clinton that surfaced during the election, one shows Clinton 
with a group of other boys surrounding Kennedy, and the other shows Clinton shaking 
Kennedy’s hand. Clinton’s campaign used these pictures in their first ad, the “Hope” 
advertisement. Clinton narrated the story: “And I remember just, uh, thinking what an 
incredible country this was, that somebody like me, who had no money or anything, 
would be given the opportunity to meet the president. That's when I decided I could 
really do public service because I cared so much about people.”36  There were almost a 
hundred boys at the event—meeting the President would be an important event for any 
teenager. But, because Clinton grew up to run for president as a Democrat, the meeting 
was especially poignant.   
This story plays into Clinton’s narrative of the American Dream because, as 
Clinton explains, it shows what an amazing country this is, where anyone can meet the 
leader of the free world. But, there are also some more subtle explanations of the 
connection between Clinton and Kennedy. Kennedy was the president during a very 
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idealistic time in America, his election was moving. Clinton wanted people to equate his 
presidency with Kennedy’s Camelot. Clinton campaigned on the same idealism, and 
wanted voters to see him as a president like Kennedy. The “New Democrat” label that 
followed Clinton also played into the idea that he would be able govern like Kennedy.  
While Clinton clearly implied the connection during this first ad, others made the 
association more overtly for him. During one of his first stops in Texas, the residents of 
that neighborhood mentioned the likeness, “Several of the people at the rally said 
Clinton reminded them of John F. Kennedy, whose, ‘Viva Kennedy’ clubs helped him 
carry the region in 1960.”37   
Clinton tried to argue, through his narrative, that he would be a president like 
Kennedy.  Being like JFK would have been appealing to those who remember the 
idealistic and innocent America of 1960.  Even as he attempted to imply this connection, 
Clinton's message was that the relationship was not of his own making; it was something 
bigger than him, outside of his control.  In his autobiography, Clinton downplayed the 
importance of the 1963 meeting with Kennedy.  “Much has been made of that brief 
encounter and its impact on my life.  My mother said she knew when I came home that I 
was determined to go into politics . . . I’m not sure about that.”38  Which is interesting 
because in his first advertisement during the 1992 election season Clinton said of the 
meeting, “That’s when I decided I could really do public service . . .”39 In downplaying 
the meeting, Clinton almost makes it even more powerful; his discussion in the book 
almost sounds like a religious calling that he was too young to understand, but that his 
mother understood.  The same mother he calls a saint, in his autobiography.40  This 
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spiritual connection to Kennedy started in Clinton's childhood, when he campaigned on 
Kennedy's behalf.  Clinton is very clear about his youthful support for Kennedy.  During 
the 1960 election, when Clinton was in the ninth grade, he defended Kennedy during 
classroom debates.  “I badly wanted him to win . . . .  Most of my classmates, and their 
parents, disagreed.  I was getting used to it.”41  Clinton admits that this early 
campaigning experience was profound, in that it solidified his love and ambition for 
politics; however, he wanted to be a Senator, not the President. 42   
In creating an association with Kennedy’s image, Clinton gathered support from 
the entire nation.  Yet, the move was particularly touching for Hispanics. Anecdotes can 
persuade either through context, or through its connection to a particular audience.43  
The Kennedy anecdote communicated two different meanings: first, the young Clinton's 
brush with greatness was clearly used to compare Clinton's potential greatness with 
Kennedy's.  Second, to the right audience (like a group of Democrats or Latinos) a 
comparison to Kennedy would be enticing, a reason to find out more about an unknown 
candidate.  Anecdotes also communicate particular values to an audience, according to 
Lewis; their credibility lies in their common sense.44  Clinton’s simple story of the quick 
meeting with Kennedy communicated two important ideas: first, the power of the 
American Dream, and secondly, his ideological connection with Kennedy, an association 
Clinton created to give himself credibility. 
Part of Clinton’s appeal was his understanding of the important issues in the 
Hispanic community.  Much like Kennedy in 1960, Clinton was there in the barrios, 
talking about the important issues: education and the economy.  Although he could not 
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compete with the image of the lean and handsome Kennedy; Clinton used his image, as a 
southern kid who understood the personal pain discrimination causes, to connect with 
Latinos.  “Indisputably, [Clinton] is the personification of that sometimes ephemeral 
entity, the New South. . .  His message, clear and compelling, is that the South paid a 
price for bigotry and has learned a lesson the rest of the country could use.”45  This 
message, although directed at all minorities, resonated with the pain Latinos felt they 
were suffering, because of discrimination.  “It is important that leaders channel the 
frustrations of citizens in positive or constructive directions when times are hard. . .  The 
Clinton message has been a sharp contrast for those who have grown weary of 
destructive racial rhetoric.”46  This association with Kennedy was not only helpful with 
the Anglo community, but was especially important to Latinos.  Clinton’s narrative 
strategy connected him with Kennedy, so that he could recreate the optimism of the 1960 
election and evoke the social history of Latinos. 
In all of these stories, Clinton created an image that he embraced the ideas of the 
American Dream, empathizing with his Latino audience. He was an empathizer, “I know 
and understand the problems of this state [Texas].”47  An advocate, “We’ve got to send a 
clear signal that we will not permit our nation to be divided anymore by race, by region, 
by gender, or by income.”48  And an inspiration, “Tonight when you go home, and the 
cheering has stopped . . . . Think in your own house, do you believe your country can do 
better?”49  The media played along with Clinton’s characterizations of himself, “He 
knows and cares about Texas,” one supporter in South Texas was quoted in a local 
newspaper.50  Clinton was an advocate who cared about the problems of the common 
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person, and fought to change the political system. This message was helpful to the 
poorer voters in America; one newspaper reported that when Clinton discovered that 
85% of his supporters had only a high school education, he was nonplussed. Clinton, a 
Rhodes scholar and Ivy League graduate was not attempting to persuade others who had 
a similar educational level. But, as journalist Walter Robinson explained, the 1992 
election was about class, and Clinton was winning, “What we have here is the electoral 
equivalent of class warfare.” 51  In his ability to draw in minority voters, “Bill Clinton is 
a Superpol who has yet to meet his Kryptonite.”52  All of these references created an 
important mystique about Clinton, which helped his credibility. 
The Scene 
Hope and the Barrios 
By sharing his own story of a childhood in poverty, Clinton was able to identify 
with a large portion of the Latino audience, and their stories.  Not only had Clinton lived 
in poverty, he was the embodiment of the American Dream, someone who had escaped 
poverty and made something of himself.  Clinton's first ad set the scene for the rest of his 
campaign; he was the “boy from Hope.” Despite the fact that he grew up in the Deep 
South and away from any Hispanic communities, Clinton understood what living below 
the poverty line was like, and he communicated that to Hispanics.53  In his first 
advertisement called “Hope,” Clinton narrated his life story: “I was born in a little town 
called Hope, Arkansas, three months after my father died.  I remember that old two-story 
house where I lived with my grandparents.  They had very limited incomes.”54  The 
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double meaning of the name of Clinton’s hometown, and the value of hope was not lost 
on his audience.55   
Clinton was communicating the power of hope when he went on in the same 
advertisement to describe his 1963 meeting with John F. Kennedy.  This anecdote is 
particularly important because it communicated not only a connection to Kennedy, but 
also an understanding of the values associated with the American Dream, specifically 
opportunity and equality. Clinton concluded the ad with a perfect explanation of his 
success, “Now it’s exhilarating to me to think that as president I could help to change all 
our people’s lives for the better and bring hope back to the American dream.”56 This first 
ad created a clear image of Clinton’s version of the American Dream: the poor kid who 
made something of himself, after a brush with greatness. 
“Hope” the advertisement also visualized a scene, the setting of Bill Clinton’s 
upbringing in a small town living with poor grandparents.  Pictures of the childhood 
home of Clinton show peeling paint and falling down shingles.  In the ad, pictures of 
rows of decrepit houses, in black and white, underlined the theme of hope as Clinton 
narrated, “That’s when I decided to do public service because I cared so much about 
people.”57  Clinton clearly made a connection between the setting of his hometown and 
his upbringing as a way to “bring hope back to the American Dream.”58   In Clinton’s 
version of the American Dream, Hope was like so many small, poor towns where many 
Americans grow up. It was a place of love (his grandparents), values (hard work, 
persistence, religion), but so poor that it almost hurts to look.  This definition of a classic 
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small town sounds like the explanation of the barrios, an important comparison that 
helped Clinton connect with Latinos 
Clinton affiliated himself with Kennedy to recreate the idealism of Camelot; part 
of that idealism included a connection with minority voters.  From the time he 
announced his candidacy on October 3, 1991, Clinton began to pursue the Hispanic 
population, even though he was unfamiliar with Hispanics as an audience.59  Within a 
month, he was campaigning to Latinos.  The media noticed Clinton’s early visits to 
South Texas in November 1991, and commented on Clinton’s attention to Hispanics.60  
Then Clinton returned to South Texas for a second visit in March of 1992; as the only 
presidential candidate to visit the area, he was “greeted like a local boy.”61  Clinton’s 
ease in the barrios of Texas was an important part of his narrative strategy: the barrios 
were an important setting for his message.62  Clinton’s many visits to the barrios of 
South Texas were an important part of his 1992 campaign.  Robert Brischetto, director 
of the Southwest Voter Research Institute concluded after polling in Texas, “It was 
obvious [in the polling data] that Clinton visited the barrios of San Antonio and South 
Texas more than his opponents.”63  The barrios of Texas provide a powerful setting for 
the rhetoric of an Anglo presidential candidate.  The barrios of Texas provide a powerful 
setting for the rhetoric of an Anglo presidential candidate and they play an important 
part in the Latino narrative.64  
  As Michael Victor Sedano found during an examination of Latino narratives, 
“Poems about the barrio abound in Chicano literature.  The overall image is of a lost or 
ruined homeland.”65  In the narratives of many Hispanics, the barrio is the representative 
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of a modern day Aztlán, the mythic homeland of the Aztecs.66  Barrios are the home 
communities of many Latinos, and even those who did not grow up in traditional barrios 
feel a relationship with the setting.  It represents the best and worst of the Latino 
community; it is both a culturally rich community and a place ravaged by crime and 
violence. Clinton’s ability to move comfortably into the barrios was a sign to many of 
his ease with Latinos.67  One of the reasons many non-Hispanics avoid the barrios is 
because of the crime and poverty, but Clinton’s apparent comfort in the setting was 
another sign to Latinos of his ease with them, and in their homes.  Clinton also used the 
economic recession of 1991 as a backdrop to his campaign.  Many minorities and poor 
people had been hurt by the flailing economy; which made Clinton's message even more 
salient to his audience.                                                
The Economy in 1992 
In his rhetoric during the 1992 campaign, Clinton connected Latinos’ frustration 
over their economic condition to the American Dream.  Many Latinos feel that 
discrimination has caused their poverty, especially the politics of previous presidents 
Reagan and Bush.  By positioning himself as an Anglo candidate who understood that 
frustration, Clinton connected with Latinos.  In a speech to a group of minorities in 
Washington, D.C., “Your success is American’s success.  . .  If you work hard, you’ll get 
ahead not just materially but in your overall ability to fulfill your God-given capacities.  
That is as it should be and that is the great legacy of our country.”68 Clinton identified 
with the minority population by admiring their values and expressing the idea that their 
values will bring success, despite discrimination.  Clinton became one of the leaders that 
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Chávez hoped for, as Chavez foreshadowed in the “Plan of Delano”, “From this 
movement shall spring leaders who shall understand us, lead us, be faithful to us, and we 
shall elect them to represent us. WE SHALL BE HEARD.”  Chávez believed that his 
revolution would create a generation of leaders who would help with the plight of 
Latinos everywhere; Clinton was a child of that revolution. Clinton told Hispanics that 
he heard them and would respect them.  Another important value in the Latino mindset 
to stop discrimination, is to change the system, to revolt.  
  Revolution is a powerful idea in Latino culture, it is a way to change the 
discrimination that is prevalent in American culture.  Just as Mexicans fought for their 
independence from Spain, and Latinos fought for their rights in California in the 1960’s, 
Latinos today see non-violent change as an important responsibility.69  As César Chávez, 
explained in the “Plan of Delano”, “Now we will suffer for the purpose of ending the 
poverty, the misery, and the injustice, with the hope that our children will not be 
exploited as we have been . . . We shall endure.”  Chávez argued that the outcome was 
worth the struggle, Clinton communicated that message to Latinos.  In his ads, when he 
said, “After I graduated I really didn’t care about making a lot of money.  I just wanted 
to go home and see if I could make a difference.” 70  Clinton talked about change, about 
revolution, about taking the few advantages he was given and using them to benefit his 
community.  Clinton’s rhetoric made him seem to understand the struggle Latinos faced 
in America, whereas his opponent did not.  In his first campaign stop in San Antonio 
during the 1992 Election, Clinton told the crowd, “If we ask Ronald Reagan’s question, 
‘Are you better off then you were four or more years ago?’ the Democrats are going 
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back in the White House.”71  The struggles of the lower and middle class are problems 
that Latinos definitely associate with, and as Geoffrey Fox argues, one of the strategies 
to associating with Hispanics in general is to empathize with those struggles.72   
The differences between Clinton’s understanding of the frustration of poverty 
and his opponents’ were obvious during the presidential debates.  When asked about the 
recession, Clinton was able to make the impact of the economy personal, whereas the 
other two candidates were unable to connect with average Americans.  During the 
October 15th, 1992 presidential debate, Clinton discussed the plight of poor American 
families, “All across America, people [talk to me] who have lost their jobs, lost their 
businesses, had to give up their jobs.”73 By discussing the effects of the recession 
personally, one on one, with voters all across the nation, Clinton made himself 
accessible. Which made him appear to be someone who understood what the recession 
had done to average citizens; this gave him more credibility with poorer Americans, 
including Latinos. 74  
  In that same debate, one moderator asked the candidates to describe how the 
1991 recession had affected them personally.  Ross Perot argued that the recession 
spurred him to run for President.  Clinton argued that it affected individuals he knew by 
name, “I have seen what’s happened in this last four years when in my state, when 
people lose their jobs, there’s a good chance I‘ll know them by name.  When a factory 
closes, I know the people who ran it.”  Clinton continued, “[The loss of jobs] is because 
America has not invested in its people. . . . Most people are working harder for less 
money than they were making ten years ago.”75  This answer expressed the important 
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values of  economic opportunity and reinforced Clinton’s concern for the poor in 
America.  Bush, on the other hand, was unable to answer the question: 
BUSH: Well I think the national debt affects everybody.  Obviously, it has a lot 
to do with interest rates.  It has — 
 MODERATOR: She’s saying you personally.  
 BUSH: Well, I’m sure it has.  I love my grandchildren and I want to think — 
 Q: How! 
BUSH: I’m not sure I get it.  Help me with the question and I’ll try to answer it.76 
 
This blunder just reiterated Bush’s distance from the personal effects of the recession: 
whereas Clinton talked about its effect on individual people, Bush could not connect 
with the average person.  In campaign speeches, Clinton would repeat the same 
statistics, “People are working harder for less money than they were making ten years 
ago, two-thirds of our people.”77  He told an audience at a minority-based community 
center in Los Angeles, “I do not want to win this election to simply change my address. . 
. . I want your life to change. I want it to be better.”78  Clinton reiterated the frustration of 
the average person, giving voice to  the problems facing the middle-income family, and 
Latinos value the importance of giving the impoverished a voice. Clinton’s narrative 
used the 1991 recession as the setting for where the country was going. Clinton’s 
narrative was a vehicle for that voice, and seemed to hear the frustrations of the 
underprivileged community, which resonated with Hispanics.  
Clinton’s 1992 American Dream 
Whereas previous campaigns had attempted to create an image of ‘moving 
America forward’ or attempting to gain votes through particular issues (such as Bush’s 
Willie Horton and crime ads in 1988), Clinton built an audience around the issues he 
thought important to Latinos in particular. Clinton accomplished this by narrating the 
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shared election story; with himself in the role of hero and advocate.  He was able to 
accomplish this by sharing in their values and validating the Latino community as an 
important group.  Many Latinos value the things that Chavez discussed in the “Plan of 
Delano”.  Clinton was able to connect to those values and share with Latinos why he was 
the right person to represent them.79 The most important step in sharing this history is to 
give it legitimacy in a larger context, and by identifying and sharing his time with 
Latinos; Clinton was able to give them legitimacy in a political world that had begun to 
question their necessity.    
In much of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, he spoke about the struggles facing 
marginalized people, from his first ad where he explained his humble beginnings, “I 
remember that old two-story house where I lived with my grandparents, they had a very 
limited income,” to his later “I feel your pain” message.  Clinton clearly wanted to 
identify with an audience that understood the struggles of discrimination and economic 
inequality.80  With a group of Cubans in Tampa, Florida, “My fellow Americans, we 
have a chance not to win a victory of party but to give the American people their 
government, their country and their future back . . .  “81 Clinton created a situation where 
all working class Americans, including Hispanics, felt a connection to this poor kid from 
Hope, Arkansas.  This connected Clinton to the values of the Latino community, as 
described by César Chávez.  Clinton was able to describe to the Hispanic population his 
understanding of their struggle and how through his belief in the American Dream he 
was able to overcome the obstacles.  The American Dream was a force that had acted in 
his life, and by extension through narrative validity, Latinos could believe that it would 
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also act in their lives.  Through that connection, Clinton gained credibility with Hispanic 
voters that led to sixty-two percent of Hispanics voting for Clinton nation-wide.82  
However, Clinton’s success with Latinos in 1992 was minute in comparison to his 
success in 1996. 
Clinton’s best resource was his ability to connect with Latinos on the issues that 
matter to them: jobs and the economy.  After winning the Democratic primary election 
in Texas, exit polling showed that Latinos supported Clinton over Massachusetts Senator 
Paul Tsongas by more than three to one.  “When we asked people what mattered most to 
them in the presidential primary, it was a tie between jobs and education.”83 Clinton’s 
continual mantra of, “It is the economy, stupid,” and his concentration on education 
resonated with Hispanic voters.84  Clinton’s view of what was wrong in America ‘rang 
true’ with the reality that minority voters had experienced, the story had narrative 
fidelity.  Clinton was able to overcome the problems his campaign had created with the 













The Republican Party’s 1994 “Contract with America,” and other measures 
considered anti-immigrant, polarized the nation on issues of ethnicity.1  During the 1994 
off-year election, voters in California, under the influence of Republican Governor Pete 
Wilson passed Proposition 187, which limited access to public programs to only those 
who could prove their immigration status.  They also passed strict English-only 
legislation, essentially outlawing bilingual education.2  Republicans in twenty-two other 
states followed California’s lead passing English-only legislation aimed mainly at 
Latinos, many of whom only spoke Spanish.  This clear anti-immigrant message from 
the Republicans caused the minority population, across ethnicities, to support Clinton.3   
 The struggle of Latinos to be a part of political decisions became even more 
important in the years between 1992 and 1996, as the political right attacked minority 
and immigrant rights.  When the Republicans took over the Congress in 1994 they 
quickly ended social programs that were important to Latinos.4  Newt Gingrich, author 
of the 1994 “Contract with America,” argued that illegal immigration, specifically from 
Mexico, was out of hand and needed to be controlled.5  In May 1995, the House passed 
several budget cuts that either reduced or eliminated even more education and social 
programs often used by Hispanics, specifically poor Hispanics.6  With their economic 
safety net under attack by Congress, Latinos were shocked when the Supreme Court also 
attacked their voting rights.  In June of 1995, the Supreme Court struck down parts of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The Voting Rights Act of 1965 had played an integral 
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role in the number of Latino legislators rising seventy-four percent from 1984 to 1994; 
this legislation allowed voting districts drawn along racial lines.  When it was deemed 
unconstitutional, Latinos felt that the judicial branch had let them down.7  The Latino 
community saw this turn of events as an unfair strike against them, as Hispanic 
Congressional Caucus chair Ed Pastor (D-Arizona.) said, “They’ve taken away our 
economic opportunities, educational opportunities and now our political opportunities.”8 
 The final setback to the Latino community came in August 1995 when California 
Governor Pete Wilson announced his run for the Presidency under the Statue of Liberty, 
saying, “that immigrants who arrived at Ellis Island had come to America ‘the right 
way.’”9  He offended not only Latino immigrants but also African-American and Asian-
Americans.  As historian José de la Isla argued;“[h]e implied that the others—whose 
ancestors arrived in slave ships or had become Americans because of land acquisition or 
who were more concerned about fleeing war, revolution, economic wreckage and ruin—
didn’t merit the same claim on the country as the European immigrants from the turn of 
the century.”10  This general anti-immigrant environment caused many minorities, 
particularly Latinos, to worry about the importance of the 1996 election.   
Unfortunately, Republicans were not the only ones to offend the Hispanic 
population; President Clinton began the 1996 campaign by offending them as well.  In 
order to protect himself from the Republican claim that he was allowing illegal 
immigrants to drain our economic resources, Clinton reiterated all the ways he had 
protected the borders.11 This argument greatly offended Latinos who feel that any attack 
on immigration is an attack on them.12   
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Clinton regained Latino voters’ respect, and ultimately won their support through 
his use of narratives. Instead of using the materialistic myth of the American Dream as 
he did in 1992, Clinton focused on the myth of brotherhood, rhetorically arguing that all 
Americans deserved a chance to have a better life. The main issue in all of the 1996 
election was immigration, which asks the most basic question about the American 
Dream, who has the right to access the Dream.  Clinton was able to argue that access to 
the Dream was a basic right guaranteed to all. In doing so, Clinton created an American 
Dream narrative where he was the narrator and protector of the Dream, and not a 
character involved in the Dream. In telling his version of the Dream myth Clinton set his 
narrative in educational facilities, arguing that education was the place where the Dream 
began.  Finally, he used several key concepts from the “Plan of Delano” to communicate 
with Hispanics his understanding of their values.   Ultimately, Clinton’s version of the 
American Dream narrative was grounded in his belief that the Dream is available to all 
members of American society, as Thomas Jefferson wrote, “all men [sic] are created 
equal.” 
The Myth of Brotherhood: the American Dream13 
 Clinton’s rhetoric in the 1996 election was dominated by the moralistic American 
Dream myth, which argues that success is possible for anyone, and that America is the 
kind of country that accepts all people. The moralistic American Dream myth reads 
much like the materialistic one.  As previously mentioned, both are based in the idea of 
success. It is this kind of openness that has led to millions of people seeking success and 
“a better life” in America.14  Whereas the materialistic myth is about financial success, 
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the moralistic myth is about “the idea of freedom that stresses the freedom to be as one 
conceives himself [sic].”15  This difference seems small at first, but the moralistic myth 
values equality, education and community.  
 The moralistic myth is very important to immigrant’s culture.  As Cullen argues, 
immigrants are the ones who keep the dream alive, “In these ways and other[s], the 
American Dream continues to be stretched, not always comfortably, by those from 
elsewhere—which in the final analysis is where every American is from.”16  The 
moralistic myth is most easily illustrated in the Civil Rights movement of the 1950’s and 
1960’s, “But most of us have believed that equality must play a role in everyday 
American life, even if that role is almost wholly theoretical.  That’s because the 
American Dream depends on it.”17  Even in 1933, during the Great Depression, John 
Truslow Adams recognized the power of equality and opportunity in the Dream: 
No, the American dream that has lured tens of millions of all nations to our 
shores in the past century has not been a dream of merely material plenty . . . it 
has been much more than that.  It has been a dream of being able to grow to 
fullest development as man and woman . . . And that dream has been realized 
more fully in actual life here than anywhere else, though very imperfectly even 
among ourselves.18   
 
America is not perfect, and is certainly not perfect in its equality, but the Dream spurs us 
to keep trying; trying is enough to bring millions to our shores and across our borders.19  
 Latinos understand this Dream.  Their ancestors were the ones who gave their 
lives for the chance at this Dream, a fight that started at the same time as the founding of 
this nation and culminated in the non-violent revolutions led by César Chávez.  They 
feel its pull and work every day to fulfill their lives through the American Dream.  One 
important component of the moralistic myth is education.  Education is the main vehicle 
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to gain success in America.  As Dan Rather explains, “Our democracy and our New 
World freedom to move beyond the circumstances of our birth have bestowed it this 
privilege of [education].”20  Clinton reinforced this idea in his 1992 campaign, 
discussing how his ability to attend Georgetown, Oxford and Yale Law School gave him 
the ability to move beyond the poverty of his childhood.21  Latinos understand the 
importance of education; in polling education is one of the most important issues in 
Hispanic’s political choices.22  In 1996 instead of arguing against immigration, which 
was a no-win issue, Clinton defined the American Dream as offering educational 
opportunity for all. 
 In the 1996 election, the Clinton campaign’s narrative of the American Dream, 
directed at Hispanics could be summarized like this:  The American Dream should be 
available to all people, regardless of race, class or gender.  I know the Republicans are 
telling you that you should not have access to the American Dream, because you are an 
immigrant.  However, I think you should.  In addition, I will help you by giving you 
access to education, which is the one way to make the American Dream a reality.  
Ultimately, the 1996 election came down to a debate about immigration, which is 
the most basic question of who has access to the American Dream. Clinton defined 
himself as the narrator and protector of the Dream, upholding the right of all immigrants 
to have access to the promise of the Dream. As the narrator of the Dream, Clinton also 
defined where it should be set, specifically he used educational institutions as the 
backdrop for his telling of the Dream and finally, he rhetorically connected with Latinos 
on some of their most important values including representing their voices and 
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upholding their right to access all of the promises of the American Dream.  However, 
first Clinton had to deal with the issue of immigration.   
Intimately related to the debate about the American Dream, is the debate about 
immigration. Who should have access to the promise of the American Dream is the 
central question about immigration.  Immigration is a tough issue there is no right side 
and there are no easy answers.  Moreover, as far as Latinos are concerned, any 
opposition to immigration is an opposition to them.  Therefore, when the Republicans 
made it their main campaign issue, they started poorly with Latinos, however, so did 
Clinton. 
The Rhetorical Situation in 1996: Immigration 
Bill Clinton started the 1996 election year by offending Latinos. However, he 
was able to turn that mistake into an advantage by defining the American Dream by the 
opportunity offered to immigrants.  Immigration has always been a contentious subject, 
for both Democrats and Republicans.  During his 1996 State of the Union address, 
President Clinton pledged to increase border patrol (by 50%), to increase inspections to 
prevent the hiring of illegal immigrants and to deny government contracts to businesses 
that hire illegal immigrants.23  Although Clinton was quick to comment, “We are a 
nation of immigrants and should be proud of that,” it was still perceived as a criticism of 
the legal and illegal immigrant population, and specifically the Latino population.24  
Several articles and op-ed pieces showed the frustration that Latinos across the country 
felt.  One writer commented that the 1996 State of the Union, “ . . . displayed a 
frightening lack of humanity toward millions of Latino families and children . . . Instead 
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of healing the deep racial and class divisions in our society, Clinton has chosen to 
exploit them.  He has jumped into the driver’s seat of the anti-immigration 
bandwagon.”25  Many of the national Latino organizations, who felt that their previous 
concerns about Clinton had been justified, shared this sentiment.26  This anti-immigrant 
backlash of 1995 and 1996 led to an increase in the number of both illegal and legal 
residents who chose to apply for citizenship.  Because of bills like Proposition 187 in 
California, citizenship allowed residents to access some of the services they had been 
using as illegal immigrants.  Furthermore, it allowed them to continue working in jobs 
that they enjoyed without the harassment of mounting discrimination.27   
Clinton blundered again in July of 1996 when his campaign answered an ad run 
by Dole’s campaign by running advertisements about the importance of restricting the 
borders.  Dole’s ad, called “Classroom” was a direct critique of Clinton’s actions as 
president:  
Two million illegal aliens in California.  Twenty thousand in our prisons; four 
hundred thousand crowd our schools.  Every year they cost us three billion tax 
dollars. Bill Clinton has fought California in court, forcing us to support them. 
Clinton fought Prop 187, cut border agents, and gave citizenship to aliens with 
criminal records.  We pay the taxes.  We are the victims. Our children get 
shortchanged.  If Clinton wins, we lose.28 
 
Republicans laid all of their frustrations about immigrants in this one ad, coupled with 
the searing verbal attack on Latinos, the visual images of this ad clearly delineated who 
the party blamed for the problems. The lines about immigrants in schools and prisons 
were attached to images of dark-haired people in prisons and dark-haired kids in school.  
Yet, at the end, with the “we pay the taxes” lines, the ad showed pictures of an Anglo 
couple, clearly distressed looking at a checkbook, and blonde kids looking downtrodden 
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as they sit in a classroom.  What makes these visual images problematic is its clear 
attack on people who appear Latino, there is no exception made for legal immigrants.  
Obviously, there is no way for someone to know visually if an immigrant is legal or 
illegal, but this is the crux of the problem with the immigration debate.  When 
conservatives, like Dole, begin to attack immigrants, it is difficult to distinguish whom 
they are attacking.  Therefore, all Latinos feel demoralized, because their legal status is 
questioned.  Clinton mistakenly responded to Dole’s ad with an ad of his own.  Clinton’s 
initial reaction was to answer Dole’s ad, which was an ill-considered rhetorical action.  
Clinton’s response ad, entitled “Signed,” reaffirmed how Clinton had signed 
legislation that increased Border Patrol throughout the Southwest:   
Bob Dole. Desperate and wrong. President Clinton doubled border agents, a 
thousand more for California. Signed a tough anti-illegal immigration law 
protecting US workers. And 160 thousand illegal immigrants and criminals 
deported, a record. Bob Dole voted against reimbursing California for jailing 
illegal immigrants. Time Magazine says his risky tax scheme could cut 2,000 
border agents.... cut 4,000 FBI. Bob Dole. Wrong in the past. Wrong for our 
future.29 
 
This advertisement added to the Latino establishment’s anger toward Clinton.  National 
Council of La Raza president Raul Yzaguirre told a gathering at the 1996 annual 
convention (which included representatives from both campaigns); “Intended or not, the 
presidential candidates are sending us a message about the status of the Hispanic 
community, they’re telling us that we don’t count, that our support is not worth soliciting 
and that we can be taken for granted.”30  However, because the ad was in response to a 
Republican ad accusing Clinton of corrupting the educational system for citizens by 
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opening up the “floodgates” to immigrants—Clinton gained Latino support by arguing 
that legal immigration was positive while carefully arguing against illegal immigration.31   
Clinton communicated with Latinos about immigration when he illustrated his 
understanding of the issues that are most important in the Hispanic population, 
specifically, opportunity.  Second, when he realized there was no "right" way to talk 
about immigration, Clinton silenced the campaign on the issue which left Dole as the 
only candidate talking about immigration and offending Latinos.  Clinton chose instead 
to talk about education and opportunity, two issues that resonate with Latinos.  This 
move forced Dole to posit his anti-immigrant views against Clinton’s belief in the 
American Dream, and immigrant populations quickly chose sides. 
Immigration is directly related to the American Dream.  The American Dream is 
the reason why so many risk their lives to enter this country.  When people enter legally, 
they are searching for opportunity and are willing to leave their families to get it.  When 
people enter illegally, it is because their situation is so desperate; they have no other 
choice but to try to make a better life.  Any criticism of this community ends up being a 
criticism of all Latinos, especially during the 1996 election when Buchanan and Wilson 
were arguing about the “right way” to enter the country.32 
The number of young Latino men who seek their fortunes in the United States 
has increased dramatically in the last two decades.  Demographers Sara Curran and 
Estela Rivero-Fuentes have found that there was a 300 percent increase in the number of 
young men (between the ages of 17 and 25) fleeing their home countries for the United 
States, between 1982 and 1997.  The research goes on to argue that the success of these 
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new immigrants is dependent on their family and friends already in the States.33  Indeed, 
the draw of this “American Dream” is enough to force some to leave their families in 
order to pursue some semblance of financial security.  Clinton’s narrative strategy was to 
reinforce his belief in the values of equality, education and opportunity, which are the 
values of his version of the American Dream. This strategy worked because these values 
have narrative validity for his audience, Latinos.  
By legitimizing an immigrant’s reasons for coming to America, Clinton 
answered Dole’s criticism of his support of immigrants, and he reinforced his belief in 
the American Dream and Latinos right to share in it.  As he discussed in one stop in 
Florida on September 6, 1996, “We sometimes forget what a remarkable place the 
United States is and how real the Statue of Liberty is in the lives of so many millions of 
our people . . . .”34  This statement legitimized the reason why so many immigrants flood 
the United States, to a certain extent Clinton was saying, ‘I understand why you want to 
be here in America, it’s okay.’  This message was persuasive to Latinos because they 
understand why someone would come to America.  This message has both narrative 
fidelity and probability.  It has narrative fidelity because they know why the Statue of 
Liberty is real in people’s lives; this story makes sense with their worldview.  The 
message also has narrative probability, because they know the ‘Dream of the Immigrant’ 
is a story that they believe, the story is repeated over and over in immigrant cultures.  
They know that when someone comes to America, they will be welcomed because 
America is a remarkable place.  This story has internal consistency and external 
consistency with Latinos: it has narrative validity.   
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Clinton also used the prosperity of freedom in the United States as another 
example of the nation’s international advantage, “I know what I want.  I want the 
American Dream alive for every person who is willing to work for it.”35  Clinton is 
reinforcing the values of equality and work, and specifically the power of the American 
Dream.36  By reiterating these values, Clinton is persuading his audience by telling a 
story that has narrative validity, which is important because it communicates Clinton’s 
“good reasons.”  It communicates that giving opportunity is the right thing to do, that 
giving opportunity is a morally correct. 
Clinton portrayed the story of the American Dream as a continuing struggle for 
opportunity and equality.  In some ways, the 1996 myth was like the 1992 myth—the  
story of success.  However, it was the myth of brotherhood, the moralistic version of the 
American Dream.  When the debate on immigration turned nasty during the summer of 
1996, his campaign pulled all offending ads and silenced the candidate on the issue, 
which allowed Latinos time to forget the comments.  Especially since Clinton’s 
opponent, Bob Dole, continued to discuss the immigration issue, Clinton appeared 
friendlier toward immigrants, and therefore gained support from voters who were 
sympathetic to immigrants.  Clinton accomplished this persuasion by separating himself 
from his audience, by being both the narrator and protector of the American Dream. As 
narrator Clinton defined the Dream, explaining what it was to the public through his 
rhetoric. He was also the candidate who could protect the Dream from those who wanted 
to change/shorten/deny it.  Clinton focused on education as being the star of the 
American Dream.  Clinton also gave his message an interesting setting; he chose poorer 
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schools and educational facilities as the scene for his telling of the American Dream.  All 
of these components together communicated Clinton’s belief in equality and community, 
a message that had narrative validity for his audience, Latinos.     
The Hero 
Clinton as Protector/Narrator 
 In 1992 Clinton was a character in his own narrative of the American Dream, he 
was a poor kid from Arkansas who had lived with the same struggles as many Latinos—
he was the star of the American Dream.  In 1996 Clinton was no longer a character in the 
story of the American Dream— he was the narrator.  At its most basic, communication 
theorist Rudolph Arnhein argues that a narrator should “be recognizable as a human 
being addressing human beings.”37  As later theorists argue, “the perfect narrator . . . 
must find his [sic] exact place on the long scale between the extremes of complete 
empathy and utter detachment.”38  Clinton, as narrator, was trying to find his way 
between being as connected as he was in 1992, and still being presidential or detached. 
Instead of characterizing himself as one who has succeeded because of the American 
Dream, instead as the narrator of the Dream, as President, he has the power to define it.   
Clinton did not speak to Latinos as an equal as he did in 1992.  Rather, Clinton 
spoke to them as a narrator, telling the story of the myth from a place separated from the 
common person—the Oval Office.  Clinton was presidential this time, watching the 
people from his higher stature.  Clinton was not arrogant in his separation from the 
people; he was simply no longer one of them.  In October of 1995, Clinton visited Kelly 
Air Force Base in San Antonio and told the mostly Hispanic audience “You have proven 
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that you could work together across racial and ethnic lines.”39  The language is different 
from 1992; no longer do “we” work together, but “you have shown personal 
responsibility.”40  This separation didn’t affect Clinton’s narrative validity, because his 
office made the separation natural.  No longer could he act as an equal with the Hispanic 
audience, he was now the President.    
Clinton was also separated from his audience, by not being the only character in 
his advertisements.  Instead of Clinton talking to the audience about his upbringing or 
his policies, the campaign hired actors to describe the wonderful things Clinton had done 
in his first four years, as protector of the American Dream.   During an education ad 
(aired in Spanish), the Hispanic actor says, “As a student and Latino I know the value of 
education . . . .  President Clinton wants to prepare our youngsters for the future.” 41  
This ad highlighted Clinton’s separation from his audience, but he was still the force that 
was working to better education, he was no longer working with the Latino population, 
but for them, as the protector of the Dream.  
Clinton, as the protector, was moving from his heightened position into a 
position that was more substantial.  His narrative strategy used simple statements to 
reinforce to the average voter that Clinton supported Latino rights, and valued their 
influence in American society.  This was an important statement during a time when 
immigrants in general were under attack, by making a few key comments he became an 
active narrator, taking sides.42  At the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute’s annual 
gala in September 1995, Clinton uttered the simple phrase (in Spanish), “Me gusto 
hablar espanol. [I like to speak Spanish],” and went on (in English) to argue for the 
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importance of bilingual education.43  This statement won over many in the audience 
because it showed Clinton’s support for the group in the middle of a national debate 
about bilingual education and the value of Latinos in America.44  These messages held 
narrative power because they reinforced Clinton’s belief in the importance of the 
immigrant population, and their language.  Clinton moved from a passive narrator to an 
advocate.  Interestingly, he continued to narrate the action of the campaign, but he took 
sides.  
Clinton rhetorically moved from the position of an unbiased narrator into a more 
active position, which sent a clear statement to the Latino community of his support.  
Narrators are helpful, especially when there are disagreements, because they help stay 
just somewhat outside the conflict and yet can influence the outcome, as rhetorical 
theorist Harald O. Dyrenforth explains, “narration is as much acting as story-telling, and 
it is within the power of the actor-narrator to lift the narration to just slightly below the 
emotional level of the dramatic scenes . . . .”45  Clinton allowed Republicans and Latinos 
to battle over the rights of immigrants and commented on the situation from his place in 
the Oval Office.  He would tell stories in his speeches of the actions Republicans had 
taken against immigrants and then he would take a side.  He would advocate for the 
Hispanic community, but he never allowed himself to become a character in the drama, 
only an observer.  As Dyrenforth argues, when a narrator takes sides it becomes a 
fascinating part of the story.  Dyrenforth’s case study of the narrator of the Thorton 
Wilder play Our Town sounds like Clinton’s approach to the 1996 election “The narrator 
takes no part in the action; he is merely an observer and commentator.  But what an 
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observer!  He is anything but impersonal or unconcerned . . . he is the friend of every 
man, woman and child in [town].  He lives and loves and hopes and dies with them.”46  
Clinton had that same kind of stake in the dealings of the Latino community, but he 
never got involved in the drama.  He simply told them that he cared and that he wanted 
them to prevail.  
When Clinton abandoned his role as a character in his version of the American 
Dream myth, he became a narrator and protector of the Dream, which he defined as the 
ability to access education.  The importance of education and the value of education 
became the catalyst for change in his myth.  As previously stated Clinton’s message to 
Latinos was ‘I will help you by giving you access to education, which is the one way to 
make the American Dream a reality.’  Clinton believed, and Latinos agreed, that 
education was the one way to get out of the cycle of poverty and discrimination that 
plagued them.  In 1992, Clinton used his narrative to tell others about how education had 
lifted him out of his hometown Hope.  The American Dream acted upon him. In 1996 
Clinton no longer told his own story, he invited Latinos to live it themselves and the only 
way to do that was to have equal access to education. And he promises to protect the 
Dream from the attacks of Republicans so that it will still exist for Latinos in the future.  
Clinton is acting upon the Dream, defining it, shaping it, and protecting it.  
The importance of education, and Clinton’s work to “improve our quality of 
life,” constituted main themes throughout the 1996 campaign.  By focusing on education 
throughout his stump speeches, and in most of his advertising toward Latinos, Clinton 
played on the positive image that Hispanics have of the educational opportunities in the 
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United States.  So many members of this community feel that education is the only way 
to gain the American Dream.   
The Scene 
Educational Facilities 
Access to education is an important part of how Latinos define the American 
Dream.  In every election, in every nation-wide poll education ranks as one of the most 
important issues to this population.   As Latino journalist and researcher, Jorge Ramos 
explains: 
Whoever wants to win the Latino vote will have to address these two critical 
problems.  Hiring a mariachi band to play at a political rally is worthless if the 
rally itself doesn’t feature a comprehensive plan for improving the quality of life 
and the quality of education for Latino children.  It’s education and the economy, 
stupid.47 
 
Clinton made sure at every stop in Latino populated areas to speak specifically about his 
plan for improving quality of life and quality of education.  According to the Pew 
Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation survey, 58 percent of Latinos rate education 
as the most important issue when choosing which candidate to vote for; among those 
born outside the U.S., the figure jumps to 68 percent.48  Giving credence to the 
importance of education meant that Clinton was giving credence to the hope that 
Hispanics put in the American Dream.   
Clinton’s camp ran an advertisement called “Education,” in this Spanish-
language ad, a young Latino college student told Hispanic voters about the education 
budget cuts supported by Republicans Bob Dole and Newt Gingrich and about President 
Clinton’s increases in scholarships and grants.  The actor ended the ad: “President 
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Clinton wants to prepare our youngsters for the future, and to have more opportunities to 
improve our quality of life.  That is why on the 5th of November I’m going to vote for 
President Clinton.”49  The ad, which was in Spanish, featured a clean cut, college-aged 
student who was clearly a model of what the Latino community hopes American 
education can accomplish.  The actor was the epitome of what education could create—a 
Hispanic who is well spoken and successful, and who cares about helping others.  The 
actor spoke to the audience as a cohort and, therefore, works to persuade them by 
arguing that Clinton understands their values.   
Education is referred to as the only way to open the door to opportunity and a 
better quality of life.  This is one instance where Clinton’s campaign used education in 
an implied way, arguing that Clinton’s education policy can give Hispanics legitimacy, 
like the young man.  The young man was education, and he wanted to share his success 
with others.  Again, this message had narrative validity with its audience.  Latinos know 
education can create success; this young man was simply the embodiment of that hope.  
According to Clinton’s narrative, the way to share in that success was through 
supporting Clinton.  On the campaign trail, Clinton was very specific about how he was 
going to protect education for the masses.  Education was not only a part of Clinton’s 
narrative; it was also the setting for his narrative.  
President Clinton first outlined a clear plan for increasing educational 
opportunity for minorities during a stop at Hillsborough High School in Tampa, Florida 
on September 5, 1996.  During the short speech he discussed several issues that later 
became staples in his stump speeches: the importance of modernizing classrooms and 
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making community college education accessible to everyone through tax credits and 
deductions.  He concluded his speech by saying, “If we do [these things] we will be well 
on our way . . . to creating an America where there is opportunity for everyone, without 
regard to their gender, their race, their ethnic background, where they start from 
economically, an America where we’re growing together.”50  The setting in this case is 
important because Clinton chose to speak at institutions that were fighting to keep access 
to education alive and many of these facilities served the minority community.   These 
institutions defined, to Clinton and his audience, the places where the American Dream 
was accessible.  
Modernizing classrooms and making higher education accessible to all through 
grants was the main message of Clinton’s education speeches during the 1996 election.  
This strategy was important because it outlined in detail what Clinton intended to do 
about increasing educational standards.  As Jorge Ramos explains, Latinos need to hear a 
specific plan to solve this nation’s education problems.  They do not like to hear only 
ideas—they want a clear plan.51  However, the real power in this message was the 
importance of allowing all Americans to have access to education, the foundation of the 
American Dream.  
Access to higher education is an important issue to Latinos because it represents 
an opportunity to a better life.  Even though statistics show that few Latinos actually 
complete a college degree, the ability to try is an important part of the freedoms America 
offers.  As Clinton discussed during a campaign stop on September 12, 1996 at Chaffey 
Community College in Rancho Cucamonga, California, “Let me say that we have to 
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make college education available to every single solitary person in America.  In four 
years . . .  we can make a degree from a community college just as universal in America 
as a high school diploma is today.”52  This statement reiterated Clinton’s belief in the 
American Dream, and the fact that education is a vehicle to realize that Dream.  His 
education message was well received as he linked education to the need to provide 
opportunities for it.53  Latinos realize that the only way they will have access to 
education is when someone in power helps them, this is the role that Clinton takes on as 
protector of the Dream.  That is why, for a majority of Latinos, education is the most 
important issue in any election.  This narrative had narrative validity; it made sense that 
they needed to support someone who would protect their right to an education. 
 The message was not the only important part of these stump speeches on 
education, so was the setting.  Clinton’s 1996 campaign trail looks like a tour of 
educational facilities, especially in California, Florida and the Southwest.  During this 
campaign, Clinton spoke at nine community colleges, high schools and educational 
facilities, including Valencia Community College in Orlando, Florida; Morris E. Dailey 
Elementary in Fresno, California; and Gulf Coast Community College in Panama City, 
Florida.54  While it seems like a well-planned campaign trail, it was much more than 
that.  These institutions were not the schools of the Big 10 or the PAC-12 (which would 
draw larger crowds); these were small community colleges and educational facilities 
built for the impoverished population. These are institutions that cater to students whose 
access to education might be in question otherwise; these places helped people who have 
struggled to get an education.  These schools stood in the gap between the poor and 
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higher education.  These were powerful settings for a well-crafted message.  By 
reinforcing the idea that everyone should have access to an education, Clinton took sides 
against the exclusionist rhetoric of his opponent.   
Values in the 1996 Election 
The “Plan of Delano” outlines several key values that are important in this 
discussion of Clinton’s version of the American Dream Myth.  First, the Plan is 
generally inclusive—arguing that anyone who fights for social justice is a brother in the 
battle for equality.  This argument derives heavily from the same “all men are created 
equal” mentality from the moralistic version of the American Dream myth. And second, 
the Plan also details the importance of fighting for what is right, being heard and finding 
Anglo candidates who will fight for equality for Latinos. As the second declaration 
explains, “we shall be heard.” 
Previous researchers have argued about the importance of the revolution in 
Hispanic social history.  Latinos are intimately aware of the battle of their fore parents, 
and believe that revolution is a necessity.  In the “Plan of Delano”, Chávez argues,  
This is the beginning of a social movement in fact and not in pronouncements. 
We seek our basic, God-given rights as human beings. Because we have 
suffered—and are not afraid to suffer—in order to survive, we are ready to give 
up everything, even our lives, in our flight for social justice. We shall do it 
without violence because that is our destiny.55 
 
Latinos believe in the revolution, the cause (la raza) because it has been the only way to 
change people’s attitudes.  And they believe that the importance of the revolution is 
more than just something that they represent.  All minorities’ struggles for equality are 
part of that same revolution.  In this sense Latinos’ beliefs about the revolution embody 
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the power of the Myth of Brotherhood.  All minorities are brothers in the fight for 
freedom, and all their hard work should be unified: 
We know that the poverty of the Mexican or Filipino worker in California is the 
same as that of all farm workers across the country, the Negroes and poor whites, 
the Puerto Ricans, Japanese, and Arabians; in short, all of the races that comprise 
the oppressed minorities of the United States . . . . That is why we must get 
together and bargain collectively. We must use the only strength that we have, 
the force of our numbers.56 
 
When Clinton defined the American Dream through the Myth of Brotherhood it was 
compelling for Latinos because they too understand the importance of sharing in the 
revolution, not only with other Latinos, but also with all minorities. This version of the 
Dream represented their values and had narrative validity in their eyes.   
Second, Clinton also represented the kind of leader that Latinos were looking for, 
as Chávez explained, “To the politicians we say that the years are gone when the farm 
worker said nothing and did nothing to help himself. . . from this movement shall spring 
leaders who shall understand us, lead us, be faithful to us, and we shall elect them to 
represent us.” 57  Clinton represented the best kind of candidate to Latinos, he understood 
their desires and was willing to represent them.  By establishing himself as the protector of 
the American Dream he became the embodiment of the “Plan of Delano”, an Anglo 
politician who would understand, lead, and be faithful; and in return, Latinos elected him. 
He communicated the ability to protect the American Dream for them, by focusing on how 
his vision of the Dream provided opportunity.  
In a move reminiscent of his 1992 campaign, Clinton focused on the importance 
of opportunity in the American Dream during the 1996 election.  In five different 
speeches in Latino areas, he discussed the importance of opportunity.  “I want an 
America where the American Dream is alive and well for any person responsible enough 
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to work for it, without regard to race or gender or background or where they start out in 
life.”58  This idea resonated throughout several different speeches in California, Florida 
and New Mexico.59  The idea of opportunity is important in the immigrant community 
because, as Latino researcher José Ramos argues in his book The Latino Wave, 
“[Latinos] long for [the United States’] freedoms and high standard of living.”60   
The message has narrative validity with Latinos because they believe in the 
freedoms offered in America.  Latinos also tend to agree with the sentiment of equality 
regardless of upbringing, because, as research has proven, Latinos are always most 
concerned with social issues; including education, poverty issues and equal opportunity.  
“When asked about the most important issue the nation or their city faces, Latinos 
consistently identify social issues.”61  Indeed, Clinton’s strategy of expanding on the 
importance of the American Dream for all was an important part of his message to 
Latinos.  
The values of the “Plan of Delano” were still powerful and compelling for 
Latinos in 1996.  The two values that Clinton used are easily represented by their 
slogans from the Plan: WE SHALL BE HEARD and UNITED WE WILL STAND.  
This is the message that Clinton used to gain narrative validity with Latinos.  He 
recognized their desire to find an Anglo candidate who would represent them and he 
shared his belief that opportunity was to be shared by all.  These narratives led to a great 
success for Clinton in the 1996 election. 
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Clinton’s 1996 American Dream  
Despite early missteps in the 1996 election, Clinton was able to retain his 
popularity among Latino voters by keeping silent on the issue of immigration.  He went 
on to win seventy-two percent of the Latino vote, the highest percentage since Johnson’s 
1964 election.62  One reason for his win was because he stayed relatively silent on 
immigration while his opponent alienated the Latino vote.  Instead of talking about 
immigration, Clinton focused on education—the way to share in the American Dream.  
Because of the anti-immigration backlash during the election, Clinton’s silence, and his 
encouragement of traditional Latino issues like education and the American Dream, led 
to his popularity in the community.  More than five million Hispanics went to the polls 
in 1996, a twenty percent increase over 1992.63  Clinton’s win was a blessing, in the end, 
for the Hispanic community, as it reinvigorated a voting bloc that had suffered a great 
deal during the anti-immigrant trends during the 1994 off-year elections.  Clinton 
revitalized them by changing the way he talked about the American Dream.   
 The American Dream myth is powerful.  Millions of immigrants cross our 
borders annually to have a chance at the success it offers.  Millions more live daily with 
discrimination and poverty hoping that it still exists.  Latinos, in particular, believe in the 
power of the Dream and continue to search for it in this country.  In 1996, Hispanics 
were under attack from the political right.  Republicans had acted in ways to make 
immigrants feel unwelcome.  Conservatives were trying to make a distinction between 
legal and illegal immigrants, but in the eyes of Latinos, any criticism of immigration is a 
criticism of them.  Latinos felt attacked, and they turned to the advocate who had worked 
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with them in 1992.  Unfortunately, Clinton immediately entered into the immigration 
debate offending Hispanics across the country.  However, he quickly retreated.  Instead, 
he created a new rhetorical message.  Clinton took on a new character, the narrator and 
protector of the Dream; Clinton’s narrative was distant, separate and presidential.  
Paradoxically, Clinton was still interested, but rhetorically he was no longer part of the 
struggle—he was the protector of the Dream and he helped to define it, but he was not in 
the trenches with minorities as he had been in 1992.  In 1996, Clinton gave Latinos 
support; spoke on their behalf, but never got involved in the drama.  He told a version of 
the American Dream myth in which community and equality were the paramount values, 
and the only way to reach that success was through education.  Instead of discussing the 
rights of immigrants, Clinton focused on the amazing opportunity offered to all, through 
the American Dream, Clinton’s narrative gave this community solidarity and an 
advocate at a time when they were being attacked from all sides.    
In the end, Clinton had become one of the most popular and well-respected 
presidents in the Latino community, but a rich boy from Texas was able to match 
Clinton’s popularity in the community. In 2000, George W. Bush created a bond 
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CHAPTER IV  
 2000 ELECTION  
The intervening years between the 1992 and 2000 elections were destructive for 
the relationship between Latinos and Republicans. The 1994 off-year election and the 
1996 presidential election brought out the uglier side of the immigration debate; 
Republicans used immigrant bashing as their main campaign issue—a fact that 
Hispanics did not forget. The Republican Party became the anti-immigrant party and the 
anti-minority party; therefore, any notice they gave to Latinos seemed insincere. Many 
Latinos believed that Republicans’ interest in them was superficial at best.  After all, 
Republicans “had long proclaimed their desire to appeal to Hispanic voters – even as 
they supported efforts that alienated them, such as the controversial 1998 poll-watching 
drive to monitor ‘unqualified’ voters, and Proposition 187, the anti-illegal immigration 
initiative.”1 From the beginning of the 2000 election Bush had a hurdle to overcome, 
Latinos believed that Republicans did not understand them; any attempt to prove 
otherwise would not have narrative fidelity.  The idea that a Republican wanted to ally 
with Latinos would not have made sense with what Latinos already knew about the 
GOP. Bush himself recognized the difficulty he faced, he commented once during the 
election, “I believe this party is anxious for a different style of campaign. I think the 
Republican Party has somehow gotten the image that we are not mindful of the concerns 
of new Americans.”2  When Bush began to campaign in 2000 he had to rebuild trust with 
the Hispanic community if he wanted his message to have narrative validity.   
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Even prior to the 1994 and 1996 elections that strongly alienated Latinos, 
Republicans struggled with connecting.  Since the 1950’s Hispanics voted for Democrats 
because they felt that Democrats understood the importance of equality of opportunity. 
Current research shows that those trends have continued into the 2000 election with 
Hispanics supporting the Democratic Party twice as often as Republicans.3 Of the 
Latinos who are Republicans most tend to be either Cuban or wealthy (a family income 
of $50,000 or higher), whereas, Latino Democrats tend to be from a lower socio-
economic groups (family income of less than $30,000) and are either Mexican or Puerto 
Rican.4  Many Hispanics feel that Democrats understand their economic necessities and 
will fight to protect programs important to them, like Medicare, Medicaid and Welfare.  
Despite all of these barriers, somehow Bush was able to persuade nearly 40% of 
Hispanic voters to vote for him in 2000.5  Essentially, he influenced many Latinos to 
vote against their economic interests.   
From the beginning of the 2000 campaign, George W. Bush made it clear that he 
was going to work to win as many Hispanic votes as possible.  Media outlets reiterated 
Jack Kemp’s proclamation that Latinos were the new “soccer moms,” and political 
consultants, particularly Republicans, were listening.6  In a sense, Kemp’s statement was 
a rallying cry to remind Latinos that Republicans would not forget them again.  
Although Republicans had been isolationist during the 1996 election and their rhetoric 
inflammatory, if not openly xenophobic and racist, during the intervening years, they 
adopted a more conciliatory stance and changed their message in 2000.  This change 
came in part because of the importance of the sheer number of Latino voters, as 
   89 
 
journalist Gregory Rodriguez explains: “In the unforgiving algebra of presidential 
politics the ‘Hispanic vote’ has long been a constant . . . marked for the Democratic side 
of the equation . . . .Welcome to the new math of Campaign 2000.”7  This change can be 
attributed to Bush; his close relationship with Latinos gave him the needed narrative 
fidelity to persuade Latinos that he wanted to mend relations with them.  Bush had a 
clear record in Texas that he could refer to; he could clearly show Latinos that while 
other Republicans had ignored them, he had always worked well with Hispanics. He was 
different than any other Republican; this knowledge gave his campaign the necessary 
credibility.  
George W. Bush approached campaigning to Latinos differently than his 
predecessors.8  He faced it differently than even his father.  Growing up in Midland, 
Texas in the 1950’s and 60’s around Latino (mostly Mexican) families, young George 
W. Bush learned what mattered to Hispanics.  He also traveled with his father to Latin 
America on business trips during his adolescence, and he has credited those trips with 
shaping his views on how the United States should carry out international relations with 
Latin America.9  Unlike any of his predecessors, Bush is fluent in Spanish and 
comfortable with the Hispanic community.10  Bush’s wife, Laura, also has close ties to 
the Latino community.  She has family ties in the predominately Latino town of El Paso 
and witnessed firsthand the struggles of minority children in education while she was a 
teacher in inner city Austin.11  Furthermore, Bush’s close relations with the Latino 
community have affected more than his views of the world, it has also shaped his 
politics.   
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Bush has been a strong supporter of immigration and Latino issues, such as 
education reform, bilingual education and increasing economic opportunity for 
minorities in general.12  During his 1994 gubernatorial run, Bush did not take advantage 
of his connection to Latinos, and, consequently only won 28 percent of the Hispanic 
vote. 13  Nevertheless, in his first four years as Governor of Texas, he made Latino issues 
a central part of his administration.  During his first term as governor, Bush was able to 
make important connections with Hispanics.  Governor Bush tried to create a program to 
help illegal immigrants gain citizenship and openly criticized “English Only” 
programs.14  Of greater importance to Hispanics, Bush did not join in the anti-immigrant 
language of the 1994 Republican mid-term election.  Governor Bush was openly critical 
of Proposition 187 and 1996 presidential candidates Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan, who 
made immigrant bashing their main campaign themes.15  By the 1998 gubernatorial 
election, he doubled the number of Latinos who voted for him; in 1998, he received 49 
percent of the Hispanic vote in Texas.16  During his time as Governor of Texas 13% of 
his appointments went to Hispanics, a small number to some, but commendable in 
comparison to other Republican governors.17  Clearly Bush’s experiences in Texas with 
its growing Latino population taught him both the issues that matter to Hispanics and the 
importance of the Latino vote.  Therefore, when it came time to run for the White House, 
Bush did not forget the importance of the fastest-growing minority group in winning a 
nation-wide election.18   
The biggest difference between Bush and Clinton was in the medium of their 
message.  Bush chose to reach out to Latinos through advertising—the campaign and the 
   91 
 
Republican National Committee spent a total of ten million dollars on Spanish-language 
advertising. 19 Unlike Clinton, who spent little time or money on advertising to 
Hispanics, Republicans spent ten times as much as Democrats in the 2000 election.20 
While Clinton did not film any television commercials in Spanish, Bush chose to use 
Spanish almost exclusively.  In his most notable advertisements Bush used his Latino 
nephew, George P. Bush, as the main character of his ads.21 Despite this difference, and 
the others mentioned, there was a unifying element between the rhetorical strategies 
Bush used in 2000 and Clinton’s 1992 and 1996 strategies.  They both used narratives, 
specifically the American Dream narrative, to persuade their audience of the importance 
of their message. This narrative strategy was the full realization of President Reagan’s 
1979 musing to Lionel Sosa, “Hispanics are Republicans, they just don’t know it.”22  
Initially, we must evaluate Bush’s narrative strategy toward Hispanics. 
Narratives 
As established in Chapter I, the key elements of a myth are the characters, the 
scene and the moral of the story.  The Immigrant story of the American Dream is a 
powerful reminder of why so many flee to America.  Jim Cullen, in The American 
Dream, argues that the Dream of the Immigrant continues to draw millions to this 
country.  It is the reason why so many feel a powerful pull to the freedoms and 
opportunities America offers.  Much like Clinton, Bush used the Dream of the 
Immigrant as a powerful narrative during his elections.  In the 2000 election, nephew 
George P. Bush was presented as the hero of the Dream, as the embodiment of all that 
immigrants hope America can give.23  Bush’s description of the American Dream was a 
   92 
 
combination of both the materialistic and moralistic parts of the myth.  He argued that 
financial success was available to everyone, and that America should give that same 
promise to immigrants, “I want the American Dream, el sueño Americano, to belong to 
all Americans . . . .  If your parents are first generation (immigrants) . . . this dream 
belongs to you as much as anyone else.”24  This interpretation of the American Dream 
was difficult for Latinos to understand, because the message lacked narrative validity.  
There are two parts to the concept of narrative validity, probability and fidelity.  
As narrative theorist Walt Fisher wrote in his book Human Communication as 
Narration, “The principle of coherence [probability] brings into focus the integrity of a 
story as a whole, but the principle of fidelity pertains to the individuated components of 
stories—whether they represent accurate assertions about social reality and thereby 
constitute good reasons for belief or action.”  Narrative probability is important for the 
story to make sense, to have consistency internally.  The beginning, middle and end of 
the story must make sense with the audience’s understanding of how a story works.  
Narrative fidelity, on the other hand, is based on the social reality of the audience.  The 
story must make sense with what the audience knows to be true of the world.  The values 
of the narrative must make sense externally with the audience’s perception of reality.  
Bush really struggled with the narrative validity of his campaign's message in 
2000. Initially, his story lacked both narrative fidelity and probability.  When he told 
Latinos that the American Dream was real and was available to them, the message 
lacked narrative probability because so many of them had watched as the American 
Dream story was denigrated by legislation like Proposition 187.  The idea that an 
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immigrant could come to America and be successful just did not make sense anymore.  
The American Dream narrative had lost much of its luster because Republicans had 
taken action to deny Latinos access to the Dream.  So, the internal consistency of the 
story was in question. The narrative also lacked fidelity because Latinos knew that 
Republicans would do everything they could to limit their access to the Dream.  Latinos 
value opportunity and equal access for all to the promise of the American Dream; 
Republicans had proven that they wanted to create a social reality that did not include 
those same values.   Bush’s campaign struggled to regain narrative validity for their 
story.   
Initially, they attempted to regain narrative probability by arguing that Bush was 
clearly someone whose actions were consistent with Latinos’ view of the American 
Dream.  He used his past experience as Texas Governor to show Latinos that the 
American Dream story was still true, at least in Texas, and that as President he would 
expand that story across the country.  He attempted to reconstruct the internal story of 
the American Dream by explaining how he had given educational opportunity to 
children in Texas, which was one way to gain the American Dream. However, this 
appeal did not solve the problem of the narrative having no external consistency.  Even 
though Latinos could believe that Bush wanted to restore the American Dream itself, 
they felt that the social reality created by Republicans would be hostile to such a change.  
This is where the campaign had to find a new character to persuade Latinos that 
Republicans could be friendly to them.  George P. Bush, son of Jeb Bush, had been 
given many of the privileges of money and power, but was still proud of his Latino 
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heritage.  When he took over as the ‘face’ of the campaign, Latinos began to see that the 
world was changing and that the Republican Party was changing also. This change not 
only needed a new hero, it also needed a new setting. “Un Nuevo Día [A New Day]” 
was coming, according to the campaign, and in that new setting the social reality would 
change.  This new day would create an opportunity for the American Dream myth to 
have fidelity again, because the Republican Party was changing.  Latinos began to 
believe that a Republican could find a way to protect their interests and give them access 
to the Dream. 
George W. Bush’s rhetorical strategies during the 2000 election were quite 
different from Bill Clinton’s strategies in 1992 and 1996.  Clinton’s rhetoric was layered 
with many different meanings, and he expertly used rhetoric to persuade his audience.  
Bush, however, had a simple message for Latinos—I am one of you, I understand you, I 
share in your vision for the American Dream. However, his message was always clouded 
by the legacy of the GOP.  While Bush attempted to show Latinos that he understood 
them and was willing to work with them, he was unable to create a message that had 
narrative validity because Latinos had not known Republicans they could trust.  Bush’s 
message did not make sense with what Latinos know about Republicans, the narrative 
had no fidelity.  However, once the campaign introduced a different voice, a different 
hero they were able to overcome that concern.  When the campaign introduced George 
P. Bush, the candidate’s half-Mexican nephew, as the face of the campaign toward 
Hispanics the message regained fidelity.  Here was someone who did understand Latinos 
and who could vouch for the fact that George W. did too.  Ironically, the message did 
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not change; both George W. and George P. were saying the same thing—that the 
candidate would protect Latino values and fight for the promise of the American Dream.  
The narrative simply did not have validity when a known Republican said it.  But, a 
Latino, who happened to be related to the candidate, did have narrative fidelity.  
In the 2000 election, Bush used the medium of television advertising to connect 
with Latinos. Few speeches were given specifically to Latinos, instead the campaign 
made commercials. This created a different perspective for the analysis, as the ads have 
both visual and rhetorical elements.  For the purposes of this chapter, I will evaluate both 
the visual and the spoken rhetoric.  
The Rhetorical Situation in 2000 
 “Para mì, la educacìon es number uno,” [For me, education is number one] a 
straight-faced and serious George W. Bush told his Hispanic audience, “Porque nuestros 
hìjos merecìan lo mejor [Because our children deserve the best].”25  During the 2000 
presidential campaign, George W. Bush reached out to the Hispanic community, not 
only in their own language, but also by recognizing their values.  On Election Day, Bush 
received 35 percent of the Hispanic vote nationwide.26  While Bush was not the only 
candidate reaching out to the Hispanic community, his campaign was seen as 
revolutionary because of the intensity of his desire to gain the Hispanic vote.27  
When Bush decided to run for the presidency, he decided that he was going to 
make a determined effort to pursue the votes of the Hispanic population.  Bush’s original 
message was to persuade Latinos using their values, specifically their support of 
education.   This strategy was moderately effective.  However, it was the inclusion of his 
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nephew in a separate set of ads, and the changing setting of the story, that rallied Latinos 
to his side.  Initially, Bush tried to mobilize Latinos by persuading them on one of their 
favorite issues, education.  
The Education President & The Fight for California 
From the beginning of the campaign George W. Bush made an effort to speak to 
as many Hispanic organizations as possible, including some organizations that 
traditionally were not kind to Republicans. The message was always predominately 
about education, an issue that he felt Latinos could identify with.  In the fall of 1999 
Bush began to speak to Latino groups in delegate-rich California, and his message was 
all about education. His first policy speech on education was given to a group of 
Hispanic leaders in Los Angeles, “Bush . . . who called himself ‘the education 
president,’ delivered his maiden speech about improving schools . . . .  ‘We do not have 
a national school board and do not need one. A president is not a federal principal, and I 
will not be one . . . When we spend federal money, we want results.’”28   This message 
continued at the Republican National Hispanic Assembly Dinner at the end of 
September 1999.  He received their yearly award for service to the Latino community, 
“‘The assembly selected Mr. Bush because of his involvement in the Latino 
communities in Texas, fostering education and revitalizing Latino neighborhoods,’” said 
Jose Rivera, the assembly's national chairman [sic].29  Governor Bush unveiled his most 
well known educational theme, “creating a system where no child is left behind,” during 
a rally in San Antonio in December of 1999.30   
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This outreach made a huge difference in Bush’s poll numbers with Latinos.  In a 
poll taken in September of 1999, 34% of Latinos said that they would be willing to vote 
for the Republican candidate, while a staggering 66% said they would vote for the 
Democrat.31 However, once Bush became the frontrunner, those numbers shifted in his 
favor.  In a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll taken in December, 52% of Latinos said they 
would support George Bush, even ardently liberal Latino groups were forced to concede 
Bush’s success with Hispanics.  The national executive director of the League of Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC) explained the change; “Bush has taken a completely 
different approach to Hispanics. He is not using the wedge issues Republicans have used 
in the past.  He is not sending out vibes to Hispanics that I’m picking on you.”32  The 
spokesperson for the National Council of La Raza explained the support in a similar way 
“Now you have a candidate who shows that he wants to be more inclusive, and Latinos 
have responded well to that.”33  Bush’s genuine attention to Latinos and their issues led 
to good polling numbers in the beginning of the election, mainly because of his focus on 
education.  
However, there was one group of Latinos that did not support Bush -- 
Californians.  While national polls showed Bush winning among Hispanics by nine 
points, polling in California showed that Gore would beat Bush by eleven points in the 
state.34  The reason for the anomaly was simple, Californians had not forgotten the hate 
filled politics of Pete Wilson,  “The huge question mark, of course, is California, where 
the state GOP alienated Latino voters in 1994 by sponsoring an ugly, racially tinged 
campaign to ban benefits to illegal immigrants . . . . [Some have] predicted that the GOP 
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has forfeited any chance of cultivating Latino support for at least a generation.”35 Bush’s 
trips to California were under girded with a message of apology, making sure that 
Latinos knew he did not agree with the politics of Pete Wilson and others,  “the fine line 
Bush is walking—appealing to Latinos and others who have recently spurned the GOP 
while holding on to his conservative base—was evident.”36 California is important to 
study in this election, because it was a microcosm for the problems that Bush faced.  All 
of Bush’s rhetorical problems were evident in California because those Latinos were still 
feeling the pain of the 1994 and 1996 elections. California is also where Bush eventually 
found a solution to his rhetorical problem, in the hero of his story. Bush needed to find a 
message that resonated with Latinos, especially in California, and the first attempt at that 
message was about education.   
Education became such a key part of the campaign to Latinos that Bush visited 
California three times during the spring and summer of 2000, and every time he met 
with Latino groups, specifically to discuss education.  As one journalist noted, “He never 
goes into a school where you don’t see him with Hispanic children.”37  By March of 
2000 Bush was leading Gore in national polls of Latinos, one poll showed that, in a two-
way race between Gore and Bush, Bush would win with 51 percent.38 Yet, Bush still 
could not persuade Californians to follow suit. In the March Primary he received only 
18% of the Hispanic vote, in comparison to Gore’s 56%.39  “Hispanics are still angry at 
former Republican Governor Pete Wilson and his drive to pass Proposition 187, a 
measure aimed at illegal immigration.”40  Bush’s campaign believed that, if he could win 
in California, he could win anywhere; so they made California their top priority.41 
   99 
 
During his first trip back to California in April 2000, Bush visited the National 
Hispanic Women’s Conference.  He spoke to them about education, focusing on 
immigrant children and their right to the American Dream. He argued against 
Republicans, like Wilson, who wanted to keep illegal children from the public school 
system.  “We will not use our children, the children of immigrants, as a political issue in 
this country.”42   This stance was risky, many conservative Republicans had supported 
the actions of Wilson and others, yet Bush’s message was clear, “I understand not 
everybody will agree with my politics. But you’ve got to agree with my vision that says 
this country belongs to you, and my leadership style that welcomes new faces and new 
voices in our country.”43  This statement rejected the politics of separation, a message 
that Californian Latinos needed to hear from Bush.  He acknowledged that he needed to 
change the image of the Republican Party “Our party, our candidate – me – has got to do 
a better job of convincing people that we want every child educated.”44   
When Bush returned to California in May for a second trip, he went to several 
poor Hispanic schools to talk about education, and celebrated Cinco de Mayo in Santa 
Ana chatting with the locals.45  Most of the trip was spent denying his opponent’s latest 
attacks on Bush’s connection to the National Rifle Association, but every stop was spent 
at Hispanic schools, “Some people aren’t going to like the idea of me saying, ‘you know, 
we ought to welcome immigrants to America . . .’ (but) I am campaigning in Hispanic 
venues, all trying to send that signal that the past is the past.”46 This message rejected the 
criticisms of his opponents and made his identification with the struggles of immigrants 
clear.  
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In the time between his second and third visits, George Bush received bad news.  
A bipartisan poll released in early May showed that Bush lost his lead among Hispanics 
across the nation, “Gore, who trailed Bush among Hispanics by 6 points in March, now 
leads by 12 points, an 18-point swing that could reflect serious volatility in a key slice of 
the electorate.”47  This unusual tumble in the polls was difficult to explain. After the poll 
was released, several Latino journalists attempted to explain the drop as voters’ realizing 
that the Republican Party’s interest in them was shallow.  “The Year of the Latino 
Voter? Only in Campaign Rhetoric,” and “Latino Voters Get a lot of Lip Service,” were 
the headlines the next day.   
No one could completely explain the drop.  Republicans argued that Hispanics 
were simply more comfortable with Democrats as Ed Goeas, a Republican pollster, 
argued, “some core Hispanic constituencies are going back [to the Democratic Party].”48  
But the problem can be explained rhetorically, Bush’s message had regained probability, 
but it still lacked narrative fidelity. Much like the Hispanics in California, Latinos across 
the nation could not understand how Bush could make his promises a reality; they felt 
that the climate of the Republican Party would not allow Bush to bring the changes he 
promised.  Bush acknowledged this himself, “I think here in California there are people 
who are skeptical that my vision of the country includes them and their families and that 
the policies I espouse would be good for them and their families.”49  Bush had to prove 
that his vision of the Dream was not consistent with the perception about his Party’s 
vision of the myth. The way he did that was to change the face of the campaign, which 
he did during his third trip to California. 
   101 
 
It is during his third trip, in June, that Bush became more focused; he spoke with 
two of the most influential and ardently liberal Hispanic groups, the National Council of 
La Raza and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC).50  However, the 
biggest change began during a stop in East Los Angeles, where he introduced his 
nephew to the crowd.  This was the beginning of a real transition in his campaign.   
George W. Bush began the 2000 election with a specific message to Hispanics – 
“you matter.”51  Throughout the primary election season, December through April, Bush 
spoke to numerous Latino groups at Hispanic conferences and visited the barrios and 
colonias of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California.52  Bush spoke about the issue 
that mattered most to Latinos: education, calling himself the “Education President.”53 
However, his attention did not work. 54   In May a bipartisan poll by The 
Voter.com/Battleground found that Bush’s numbers with Latinos had dropped by 
eighteen points in two months and that Gore’s favorable rating among Latinos was 
twelve points higher than Bush.55  This pro-education message worked for a time, but by 
May, Hispanics were no longer persuaded by the message.  The narrative lacked 
narrative validity because Latinos did not believe that a Republican could had a real 
commitment to their issues, the story lacked narrative fidelity. Latinos still could not 
believe that a Republican would really work on their behalf; they had not seen it happen 
in more than 20 years. Even though Bush was willing to work with them, there was a 
concern that he was just one person in the larger GOP machine, which was not willing to 
compromise.56   In order to understand why Bush’s message did not translate into long-
term Latino support, I will evaluate two education-based advertisements.  
   102 
 
“Education in Texas” Advertisement  
In the ad “Education in Texas,” Bush promoted his record in Texas.  The ad 
began by focusing on the paradox between the strong economy and the weak position of 
Latinos in the marketplace; this message resonated with Latinos who felt that they had 
not profited from the growing economy.57  Then the ad focused on Bush’s education 
accomplishments in Texas—two important parts of the ad are the visuals and the focus 
on “education.”  
The advertisement said:   
(Female announcer)  They say that the economy’s better than ever, but in our 
neighborhoods, we feel forgotten.  We need a better education.  And that means a 
new commitment.  In Texas, Governor Bush raised academic standards and 
teacher salaries.  Test scores have improved.  Now minority children in Texas 
lead the country in academic improvement.  (George Bush)  For me, education is 
number one.  Because our children deserve the best.58 
 
The visual images in the advertisement added to the narrative being told by the 
announcer. The beginning of the ad showed depressing scenes of a run-down 
neighborhood with the pictures shot in black and white and somber music playing in the 
background.   There are images of a Hispanic young man, his hand on his chin, looking 
completely hopeless; embodying what life can be like for Latinos who are not successful 
in America. 59  The producers put into visual images the narrative that Latinos told about 
their situation.  The announcer’s language included us/them language, which invites an 
association between the audience and the narrator.  The narrative reiterated how Latinos 
felt that their government has forgotten them.60   Then the announcer said, “We need a 
better education.  And that means a new commitment.”  Then the tone of the music 
changed, the images go from black and white to color.  These visuals complemented the 
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narrative that a change was coming, something that will take the audience from grey to 
color.  Children are shown running and happy, enjoying time in a classroom, raising 
their hands and smiling as a Latina teacher walks between the desks, then children 
running home laughing at the end of the day. The ad concluded with a synopsis of 
Bush’s accomplishments in Texas and a personal message from the candidate, “Para mì, 
la educacìon es number uno, [For me, education is number one].  Porque nuestros hìjos 
merecìan lo mejor” [Because our children deserve the best].”61 
The change from black and white to color is a visual depiction of this ‘nuevo día’ 
that Bush’s later ads promised.  The children looked happy; they are laughing and 
enjoying learning.  They ran home from school, smiling.  This is a dramatization of the 
fulfillment of Bush’s promises, if elected.  This last part of the ad looks like the Hispanic 
ads that come later in the election.  Bush is casually dressed, in a living room setting, 
relaxed.  He spoke straight to the audience, sternly telling them what is important to him.  
His voice was strong; he seemed willing to fight for their children.  It was important to 
convey that strength, especially on this issue that was important to Hispanics.62  
“Education” (Spanish) Advertisement 
While the advertisement “Education (Spanish)” debuted on the same day as the 
“Education in Texas” ad, there were some important differences.  Whereas the 
“Education in Texas” ad focused on Bush’s accomplishments in Texas, the “Education” 
ad set up his basic educational beliefs, ideas that would later be incorporated into his 
educational plan for the future, if elected.  
(Male Announcer)  One out of every five children born in this country is Latino.  
Their education will not only define their future, but the future of our nation.  
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George W. Bush knows that an education will bring opportunity.  He wants every 
child to read well, that parents can choose the best school for their children and 
that schools are held responsible for their performance.  (George W. Bush)  For 
me, education is number one.  Because our children deserve the best.    
 
The images in the “Education” ad are of children, from the opening shot of a Hispanic 
girl and a White boy until the last shots of college-age students.  In the ad the children 
are having fun, laughing in class, watching a parade, reading and generally enjoying life.  
When the announcer says, “George W. Bush knows that education will bring 
opportunity,” the image changed to George and Laura Bush sitting amongst students in a 
classroom setting, talking to them and reading to them. Bush’s Spanish ads differed from 
the type usually targeted at Anglo audiences.   
Under the advice of Sosa, Bush’s Spanish ads did not show him speaking to 
crowds, but interacting with the public and talking candidly with the viewers.63  Images 
of a pontificating politician can be positive or negative: they can recreate a powerful 
event to allow the audience to feel the excitement of the campaign trail, or they can show 
the politician as unconnected to the audience.  Anglo media consultants use these 
pontificating images to prove the candidate’s ability to lead.  However, this strategy does 
not work with Hispanics; communication consultants say that, like many others, 
Hispanics prefer more communicative speakers.  They are less concerned with 
candidates who appear presidential, and more concerned with candidates who can 
understand them. They want to feel like they know a candidate.  They want to watch the 
candidate on TV and feel that the candidate is talking to them, not at an undefined 
audience.  They want to feel that the candidate is down to earth and real.  Putting a 
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candidate in ‘presidential’ settings only causes the Hispanic audience to feel 
disconnected from the candidate.64 
There were also no contrasting images of hopeless children; it is clear that these 
happy faces are part of Bush’s ideal new day.  This ad covered other educational issues 
such as Bush’s stance on school choice and teacher’s salaries.65  Most Hispanics agreed 
strongly with Bush on school choice.  They felt that educators should be held 
accountable for the education they are providing.66  This ad laid the groundwork for 
Bush’s educational plan ‘No Child Left Behind,’ which came later, but this ad clarified 
Bush’s opinion of the important issues about education.    
 A second difference in the “Education” ad was the announcer.  This announcer 
was used in order to reach a specific audience -- Mexicans along the U.S. border. The 
announcer on this ad was a male with an unusually thick accent, almost unintelligible. 
His dialect was consistent with the thick Mexican-accented Spanish that was spoken 
along the border. 67 Usually producers choose to hire announcers that have clear diction 
and pronunciation as in the “Education in Texas” ad, where a woman with polished 
enunciation is the announcer.  Nevertheless, in this case, I believe the decision was a 
strategic one.  
These advertisements were not as successful as the campaign would have hoped.  
These ads served to show Latinos that Bush understood what was important to them.  
Nevertheless, the message did not resonate in such a way to translate to votes because 
the narrative was answering previous criticisms. 68  After the 1996 election, many 
Hispanics no longer trusted Republicans to protect and support public education. Latinos 
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believed that Republicans in general were anti-Hispanic; therefore Bush’s message had 
no narrative fidelity for them.  They did not believe that a candidate with an R after his 
name could uphold their values or beliefs.  In the Plan of Delano Chávez wrote about 
finding candidates who would understand, lead and be faithful to Hispanics.69  Latinos 
did not trust Republicans to do that.  Bush and the GOP needed to reestablish that they 
were not just saying they believed in education, but would support their belief with 
action. 70   
Bush spent a great deal of time at the beginning of the election talking about the 
education issue.71 As Bush himself explained in a stop in Los Angeles, “"I've got a lot of 
challenges in the state of California, I've got to change the perception that our party is 
anti-education . . . . Some think our party is anti-immigrant. But, we're making 
progress.”72  As one journalist explained, “Typically, when speaking to Latino 
audiences, the Texas governor stresses Latinos’ ability to overcome persistent obstacles.  
He deftly appeals to Latinos’ pride in ethnicity while simultaneously declaring that they 
are integral and capable members of mainstream America.”73  The main theme of Bush’s 
early speeches to the Latino community was education.  Hispanics care about education 
because they see it as the key to opportunity and the American Dream.  Bush was able to 
successfully convince Latinos that he cared about this issue.  His narrative was clear, 
“For me, education is number one.”74  No matter what the Democrats tried to do, they 
could not seem to persuade the American public that Bush did not care about education, 
in DNC polls run during the election, 42 percent of Americans thought that Bush would 
do a good job on education, while 46 percent thought Gore would.75  Clearly, the 
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American public believed both candidates would protect public education in America, 
which was a winning strategy for Bush since he started off the election attempting to 
dispel the myth that Republicans were anti-education.  However that did not correspond 
to actual votes because Latinos still wanted proof that Bush truly understood them.76  
Therefore, George W. Bush had to find a way to connect with Latinos and to persuade 
them to cross party lines and vote for him.  He did that by making his nephew, George P. 
Bush, the hero of his campaign narrative. 
The Hero 
George Prescott Bush 
After his introduction to the public in California, George Prescott Bush, the 
oldest son of Jeb and Columba Bush, quickly became the face of his uncle’s campaign 
targeting Latinos.  P., as he is referred to, is Hispanic (Columba is originally from 
Mexico), and he is fluent in Spanish.  At one of the very first campaign stops after the 
convention, the staff decided that George P. Bush would be key in the Hispanic 
community.  Lionel Sosa explained the reason why the campaign decided to use P.,  
I first saw him when he and I were in San Bernardino, California . . . .  We were 
told, ‘This is a group of important Democrats, and we need to get our message 
out.’  What I didn’t realize was that these voters were not just ordinary 
Democrats.  They were César Chávez United Farm Worker Union Democrats!  
As I arrived, a fellow making a speech at the podium declared, ‘The enemy is 
among us.’ . . . Then George P. Bush arrived . . . .  They came to him . . . .  One 
man about forty years old came up to him and said, ‘I want to shake the hand of 
the man who will be the first Hispanic president of this country.’77  
 
Subsequently, Sosa realized what an important instrument P. could be.   
P. was a willing participant.  He believed in his family and was more than willing 
to help his uncle.78  This willingness also helped George W. Bush in the eyes of 
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Hispanics because “[t]o Hispanics in the United States, ‘family helping family’ is the 
best thing anyone can possibly do.”79  Therefore, P.’s willingness to help was a way for 
the campaign to bring in more Hispanic voters by reaffirming the importance of ‘la 
familia.’  Several times George W. Bush referred to his nephew as “my family blood” 
during rallies at Latino dominated locations.80  This familial connection reiterated to 
Latinos that not only was he a supporter of Hispanics--he was also family.   
Earlier in the campaign George H.W. Bush (the candidate’s father) was actually 
criticized by the media and silenced by the campaign for possibly referring to the Bush 
family’s ‘right’ to the presidency.  “[T]he former president is being kept out of the 
limelight by Mr. Bush’s campaign for fear that he would muddle the message.  His 
praise of George W. as ‘this boy, this son of ours’ during the New Hampshire primary 
backfired, reinforcing the sense that the family was somehow entitled to the 
presidency.”81  Nevertheless, P.’s willingness to help his uncle did not backfire; it was a 
clear and important message throughout the campaign.82  It was a quick political 
introduction, at the beginning of the campaign the P. was just another shivering 
volunteer in New Hampshire; by the convention he was an integral part of the campaign 
strategy, and the reason he got the promotion was his cross-cultural appeal.83  Bush’s 
explicit embrace of P. was a key component of the myth the campaign told—P. was an 
example of what the American Dream can accomplish. 
The campaign made an interesting strategic choice: by placing attention on P. it 
was diverted attention away from the candidate.  George W. Bush was not the main 
character in the narrative to Latinos, he was not the narrator—he was simply someone 
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that the main character discussed and vouched for.  In previous ads, George and Laura 
Bush were frequently pictured, however once the campaign began to use P., the 
candidate almost disappeared from advertisements. The use of P. gave the campaign 
narrative fidelity and probability.  Narrative fidelity because Latinos knew that only 
another Latino could truly understand their history.  In the Plan of Delano, César Chávez 
makes several references to the importance of unity with other social movements, but 
ultimately the fight of the farm worker was a Latinos’ revolution. “It is clearly evident 
that our path travels through a valley well known to all Mexican farm workers. We know 
all of these towns of Delano, Madera, Fresno, Modesto, Stockton, and Sacramento, 
because along this very same road, in this very same valley, the Mexican race has 
sacrificed itself for the last hundred years. Our sweat and our blood have fallen on this 
land to make other men rich.”84  In Chávez’s mind, and in the mind of others the only 
way to truly understand the struggle of Latinos, one must be Latino.  George P. 
understood the power of the revolution.  
George P. Bush was the main character of the narrative: he was the ideal, 
embodying what Latinos hoped for in the future, the hero.  He was the possible “first 
Latino president,” someone all Hispanics would vote for, and they embraced his 
message as he proclaimed “I am a young Latino in the U.S. and very proud of my 
bloodline.”85  Both a Bush and a Latino, George P. gave his uncle the credibility in the 
Latino community that the education ads did not deliver.  Prior to George P.’s début, the 
candidate would tell Latinos that he understood and that they mattered.  However, 
George P. gave that message ethos.86 He also gave his uncle’s message narrative fidelity; 
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P. was able to tell Latinos the Republican Party is changing—look at me.  If they can 
accept me, they can accept you.  He made his uncle credible and, so instead of narrating 
the message, George P. became the main character –the hero of the story.  The setting of 
the advertisements was another important component in the campaign’s telling of the 
American Dream narrative.  In order for Latinos to see that a change was possible, they 
needed to see the world in a new light. Bush’s campaign was able to provide that by 
promising a new day in America.  
The Scene 
Nuevo Día 
The new day message was incredibly simple.  Bush’s campaign ran a small series 
of ads, recorded in English and Spanish, which were shown in heavily Hispanic states.  
The series was entitled “un Nuevo día [A new day],” and the ads featured the new hero 
of the story—George P. Bush.   
“Nuevo Día” is one of the two ads that featured George P..  In this particular 
advertisement George P. discussed the values he felt were most important, “In many 
ways I am like any other American, I believe in opportunity, a level playing field for 
everyone, and the achievement of the American dream.”87  P. closed by saying that he 
had an uncle that agreed with him on these values, an uncle with the same name.  
However, this message was important because it deviated from the message that 
Hispanics felt they had been hearing from Bush’s GOP predecessors.88  Visually, the 
messages were clearly shot to interest Latinos, the visual aspects were unusual for 
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presidential campaign rhetoric: the camera angles were different and the advertisement 
never identified the candidate’s party affiliation.  
Both of the ads featuring P. were shot with close-ups of P.’s face.  By shooting 
the commercial at such an intimate distance, it felt like P. was talking directly to the 
audience.  Hispanic voters appreciate face-to-face contact; they prefer a communicative 
style that Kathleen Hall Jamieson has defined as effeminate.89 If they feel a connection, 
they are quick to listen.90  The close-up, intimate connection to the audience also 
reminded Latinos that P. was one of them.  His first ad began, “I am a young Latino in 
the U.S. and very proud of my bloodline,” this statement reiterated his connection with 
Hispanics.    Both of these ads were shot in ideal settings, open fields full of sunshine 
and beautiful trees and wildflowers.  George P. slowly walked through these settings as 
he spoke with Latinos.  This beautiful backdrop just reiterated that it was going to be 
different in the Bush administration. The setting of a new day was illustrated by this 
simple setting—a place for rebirth and renewal. The ad concluded with a small picture of 
George and Laura Bush, and the George Bush for President logo.  There is no discussion 
of party or affiliation, only the connection between the young man and his uncle who 
also believed in freedom, opportunity and the American Dream for every Latino. 
One of the cardinal rules Lionel Sosa set up early in the election was that the 
campaign was not to identify Bush by party; Hispanics are not persuaded by party 
affiliation.91 Even in the Plan of Delano, Chávez disregards party affiliation; “We seek 
the support of all political groups and protection of the government, which is also our 
government, in our struggle.”92  Latinos do not care what party the candidate is a 
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member of—they only care that they will be represented fairly by the government.  On 
the campaign trail during the 2000 election, Hispanics reiterated their feeling that party 
affiliation was unimportant; restaurant owner Julio Martinez said, “When it comes down 
to the presidency, you don’t go toward Democrat or Republican.  You go toward the one 
who is going to do the best job.”93  None of Bush’s 2000 Spanish ads ended with the 
traditional campaign graphic identifying Bush as a Republican, running mate Dick 
Cheney was absent from all Latino ads.  
Instead, at the end of the ads featuring George P. Bush, there was a simple 
message.  In the last seconds of the commercial a single slide was shown on the screen 
(for only a second and a half); it was dark blue with white lettering, and it said, “Es Un 
Nuevo Día” [It is a new day].”94  This was the message of the Bush 2000 Campaign: 
things were going to change, and Bush would lead that change. While it was a departure 
from the previous GOP campaign, its importance was grounded in a subtle message 
referenced by this phrase.  It told Hispanic voters to expect something new from this 
candidate, and that he would treat Latinos differently, he would help the Latino 
community. This message gave the campaign more narrative fidelity—in order for 
Latinos to believe that Republicans could accept them they needed to see that the scene 
had changed.  And it did, it was a new day, according to Bush’s campaign.  The rhetoric 
was almost biblical in its nature: a rainbow of hope that this candidate offered the 
Hispanic community.  Bush promised that a change was coming, and that the pain and 
suffering of yesterday would be over permanently.  
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 Reminiscent of Reagan’s “its morning in America” commercials, the assumption 
that Bush could usher in an idyllic time, a time that would be better for Latinos, was 
clearly the message. 95  At the heart of that change is the promise of the American 
Dream. The Dream is an important narrative to many Latinos, in his 2000 election; Bush 
was overt in his use of the term to draw in Hispanics.  He not only discussed it 
frequently, he also explained it in such a way that the values corresponded to the values 
that Latinos hold dear.  
El sueño Americanos es para todos 
Ronald Reagan’s 1979 musing that Latinos “were Republicans, they just don’t 
know it yet” was based on his perception of the religious values of Hispanics.  In 2000 
when George W. Bush’s campaign used narratives to connect to Latinos’ values they 
used very different values.  Bush spoke about the importance of the American Dream 
openly and at every stop in Latino communities, he used the Spanish, “el sueño 
Americano,” arguing that the dream should be available to everyone.  This value of 
opportunity is one of the values outlined in the Plan of Delano, “UNITED WE SHALL 
STAND.”96  Also, by using his nephew, George P. as the hero of the American Dream 
Myth, Bush’s campaign message had more narrative validity because Latinos could 
understand that another Hispanic would understand their values.  As the Plan argues, 
“We are sons of the Mexican Revolution, a revolution of the poor seeking, bread and 
justice . . . . from this movement shall spring leaders who shall understand us, lead us, be 
faithful to us, and we shall elect them to represent us (emphasis mine).”97  P. was a 
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descendent of this movement, he was the leader that was to come.  This meant that his 
support of George W. Bush had a great deal of weight to Latinos across the nation.  
The moral of the story for the Bush campaign was simply stated when George W. 
Bush began telling audiences very early in the campaign, “I want the American Dream, 
el sueño americano, to belong to all Americans.”98  Bush did everything he could to 
prove to Latinos that he believed that the American Dream was a promise that all 
Americans share. This inclusive message continued to his views of immigration, “If you 
have to make a choice between 50 cents an hour and five dollars an hour and you believe 
in the family, there’s a pretty good chance you’re going to take the risk necessary to 
come and work to put food on the table.  That’s a reality, a human reality, and it’s as true 
today as it’s ever been.”99  By showing he understood the tough decisions faced by many 
illegal immigrants across the nation, Bush was able to show them that he truly believed 
that all Latinos had a right to have their voices heard.  
From the very beginning of the campaign Bush gathered a group of first-
generation immigrants who had business success to be his advisory board, called the 
“American Dreamers.”100  As one member explained, ''We're going to raise money, 
basically, American Dreamers, the concept, the governor is very, very upbeat about it. 
He feels that's the reason why a lot of us are here, to fulfill the American Dream.''101  
Unlike any of his predecessors, Bush actually used the term the “American Dream” 
frequently during the 2000 campaign.    In order for Latinos to believe that this candidate 
would be willing to fight for their right to the American Dream, Bush’s campaign also 
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called him a compassionate conservative, a label that gave Latinos a reason to believe he 
would work for them.  
Bush’s use of the moniker “compassionate conservative” was, in part, a strategy 
to connect with minorities.102  Bush and his advisors knew that the minority community 
had not been happy with the 1996 election that had centered on the advantages and 
disadvantages of immigration, and this slogan was created to remedy that concern; it 
communicated the difference between other conservatives and the Governor.  Taken 
from the writings of Marvin Olansky, the idea is based in the argument that government 
control of social programs has created a dependent welfare state.  Olansky argued that 
only through personal responsibility would someone be able to take care of himself or 
herself.  This idea also laid the responsibility for social programs in the hands of private 
citizens, rather than the government’s hands, an idea consistent with many political 
conservatives.103 Bush made an effort to make himself comfortable with the Spanish 
language and the Spanish media.  These efforts helped him sell the story of himself as a 
compassionate conservative.   
During this election he made himself more open to the Latino media than his 
opponent did, and, in doing so, he spoke to the Latino population about his concerns and 
his views of Hispanic issues.104  As Adam J. Segal, director of John Hopkins 
University’s Hispanic Voter Project, concluded in his 2000 Report, the decision to target 
the Spanish language stations, especially in Florida, may have won him the 2000 
election.105  
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Early on, there was some backlash to the “compassionate conservative” message 
from Latinos, “Our community doesn’t need compassion.  Even talking to us in that way 
treats us as a stepchild,” Rep. Robert Menendez of New Jersey complained in September 
1999, “We don’t need compassion; we need educational opportunity… healthcare 
security and access to capital.”106  However, that early criticism quickly silenced as the 
message reached the Latino population. More Latinos began to support Bush, and any 
questions about his loyalty ended.107 
 George W. Bush continued to use the phrase “el sueño Americano es para todos,” 
throughout the campaign.108  It was the core of the campaign as Ted Cruz, Bush’s 
domestic policy advisor, explained, “What it comes down to is communicating the 
message that George W. Bush believes everyone is part of the American dream and the 
model is really the Texas experience.”109  George P. Bush reinforced it in his ads and 
speeches.  In both speeches he mentioned the candidate’s belief in the American Dream. 
Combined with P.’s place as the hero of the American Dream myth, it was a powerful 
way to boost the candidate’s ethos, which translated into more Latino votes for Bush in 
the 2000 election. 
Bush’s 2000 American Dream: Commitment Forgotten 
Although Lionel Sosa argued that his philosophy was to keep Latinos at the 
forefront of the candidate’s mind, the Bush campaign seemed to forget about the 
Hispanic community early in the fall of 2000.  During that time, the number of Spanish-
speaking ads, and ads directed at Hispanics, dropped dramatically.  Two changes in the 
campaign caused this; first, the Republicans began to take the Hispanic community for 
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granted, assuming that they had made the connection they needed to win and, second, 
the party’s commitment to the Hispanic community was not as strong as the campaign 
originally indicated.  
 At the outset, it appears that the campaigns ads did bring in more Hispanic voters 
to Bush.  He did win 38 percent of the Hispanic vote nationwide.  In exit polls run by 
Republicans, Hispanics were asked several questions, “Do you feel more important in 
this campaign?  Do you feel that one candidate or another was talking to you?  Did you 
feel that your vote made a difference?”  A majority of the Hispanic community answered 
“yes” to each of these questions.110  It appeared that Bush succeeded in persuading 
Hispanic voters by overcoming their negative feelings toward the Republican Party and 
then by persuading them to abandon the Democrats and vote for him.  He did this by 
talking about their issues, then using his nephew to give his campaign credibility and 
finally creating an environment, “Un Nuevo Día,” that illustrated what they could 
receive if they voted for him.   
During the campaign many Latinos questioned Bush’s commitment to his 
campaign promises.  This distrust came from generations of broken promises from 
politicians.  Hispanics were aware that they are one of several audiences that become 
important only when candidates needed them.  When Bush began to abandon his 
Spanish-speaking ads, it reinforced their distrust of the candidate.  Bush’s narrative was 
good; however, it was too idealistic, el nuevo día seemed too good to be true.  Articles 
such as, “Latinos Waiting for Bush to Make Good on Pledge of a Diverse 
Administration,”111 “Latino Voters Get A Lot of Lip Service”112 and “The Year of the 
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Latino Voter?  Only in Campaign Rhetoric”113 (all written by Hispanic journalists) 
permeated the media.  Groups that thought Bush was going to fulfill his campaign 
promises, like easing restrictions on illegal immigrants, appoint more Latinos to the 
cabinet, and reform the INS were deeply disappointed.114 In fact, after the campaign 
many in the Hispanic community said that they felt the campaign push for their vote was 
disingenuous. The commitment that Bush made to Hispanics in the campaign was not 
followed by action in the White House.  This might have affected Bush’s chances in 
2004. However, the terrorist attacks of Septmber 11, 2001 drastically changed the 2004 
election, Latinos and Hispanic issues were rarely discussed.   
Research has shown that Hispanics will pay attention if you are talking to them, 
but not if you fail to keep your promises.  Minority groups in general tend to have long 
memories about who has been helpful to them and who has simply used them.115 Bush 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
The American Dream narrative is a powerful and integral element of the 
American story.  It is the reason millions flock to our borders every year, with the hope 
that someday they can achieve success.1 The promise of the Dream is a story that 
resonates not only with immigrants, but with all Americans.2  As one discovers how 
many different opportunities one can get from being American, one redefines and 
expands the Dream narrative.  Presidential candidates use different definitions or visions 
of the American Dream myth as they seek to gain supporters.  The different ways that 
candidates explain the Dream show the limitations and boundaries of the myth—and 
those margins affect the future of this country.  As James Cullen argued “…the 
American Dream continues to be stretched, not always comfortably, by those from 
elsewhere—which in the final analysis is where very American . . . is from.”3  
Presidential campaigns stretch the definition of the American Dream every time.  
In this chapter, I will evaluate the conclusions of the other four chapters by 
reiterating the different characters, settings and values each narrative advocated and, 
finally, discuss the limitations of my research and make recommendations for areas of 
future research.  
The American Dream Myth: 1992-2000 
 Each retelling of the American Dream myth creates characters, settings and 
values that make up the American story.4  The American Dream story is a powerful 
motivation for minorities, Hispanics in particular.  Many of them sacrifice everything for 
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a chance at the promise the American Dream offers.5  Candidates who have been able to 
communicate to Latinos about the American Dream—to use their values and their 
stories—have often been successful. 
1992 Election 
In 1992 Bill Clinton used his personal story of an upbringing in extreme poverty 
as a way to connect with Latinos.  Clinton told the true story of a boy from Hope, 
Arkansas who, through education, was able to become President. As Clinton himself 
described in his autobiography, “I thought I could make it [in politics] without family 
wealth or connections . . . Of course it was improbable, but isn’t that what America is all 
about?”6   His story resonated with Latinos who want to believe that the American 
Dream narrative is still alive and well.  He emphasized the materialistic version of the 
American Dream myth—the idea that financial success is possible in America.7 Clinton 
initially told the story with himself as the hero of the story, as an example of what the 
American Dream can accomplish.  
Bill Clinton, as the main character of the story, made something of himself 
because of the opportunity that America offered. “I was born in a little town called 
Hope, Arkansas, three months after my father died.  I remember that old two-story house 
where I lived with my grandparents.  They had very limited incomes,”8 Clinton 
explained in his first national advertisement, “I worked my way through law school with 
part time jobs — anything I could find.  After I graduated I really didn’t care about 
making a lot of money.  I just wanted to go home and see if I could make a difference.”9 
Clinton’s life, much like the lives of his audience had been affected by financial choices. 
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This narrative connected with Hispanics understanding of the struggles of poverty and 
the idea that the only way to escape poverty is through education.  Clinton also took on 
another role, as a well-loved historical President.  
Clinton compared himself to John F. Kennedy, who is seen by many as the first 
Hispanic president.10  Clinton’s campaign publicized his quick meeting with Kennedy in 
1963, emphasizing the effect it had on Clinton’s future, “And I remember just, uh, 
thinking what an incredible country this was, that somebody like me, who had no money 
or anything, would be given the opportunity to meet the president. That's when I decided 
I could really do public service because I cared so much about people.”11  Clinton 
understood the issues facing the Latino population and, by connecting to the image of 
John Kennedy, he was able to make strides in the community because of the deep 
affinity between Kennedy and Hispanics.  
The setting for Clinton’s story was also important; Clinton set his story in his 
hometown, a place that held both poverty and hope.  This setting held narrative fidelity 
with Latinos, because they grew up in similar communities, the barrios.  The barrios of 
Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California seemed much like Hope, Arkansas—they 
were places of both great poverty and great pride.  Latinos know that out of desolation 
can spring hope.12   Clinton also used the economic setting as a way to set the stage for 
his narrative. The economy in 1991 and 1992 was turbulent and especially difficult for 
minorities.  There was a great deal of frustration with the previous two administrations.13 
Hispanics, and others, felt that the trickle-down economics of the Reagan and Bush (41) 
administrations had made them poorer.  Clinton used that frustration to his advantage, 
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arguing that he understood that pain and that he would work to change it, “All across 
America, people [talk to me] who have lost their jobs, lost their businesses, had to give 
up their jobs.”14  His narrative was successful with Latinos because he was able to show 
Latinos that a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas, could empathize with their plight, and 
wanted to fix it.  
Clinton presented himself as the embodiment of what César Chávez predicted in 
the “Plan of Delano”, “. . . from this movement shall spring leaders who shall understand 
us, lead us, be faithful to us, and we shall elect them to represent us. WE SHALL BE 
HEARD.”15 Clinton also represented the importance of persistence, he was proof that 
hard work can pay off, as Chávez argued, “We draw our strength from the very despair 
in which we have been forced to live. WE SHALL ENDURE. . . . To those who oppose 
us, be they ranchers, police, politicians, or speculators, we say that we are going to 
continue fighting until we die, or we win. WE SHALL OVERCOME.”16 Latinos 
believed in Clinton’s story because the American Dream myth has narrative fidelity and 
probability to them. They believe that America is a place where a boy from Hope, 
through hard work and persistence, can become President, and that that President would 
someday listen to them and represent their voice. That story holds true to their 
understanding of what America has to offer. This story also holds true with basic Latino 
values, such as the value of opportunity.  
1996 Election 
In 1996, Clinton chose to change his story of the American Dream.  He was not 
connected to Latinos the same way he had been in 1992.  He had won them over 
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throughout the intervening years by implementing policies that they agreed with.  But, 
he was the President—he no longer had a familiar connection with them.  Instead, 
Clinton used the myth of brotherhood narrative of the American Dream—the idea that 
everyone should have access to the American Dream—regardless of race, ethnicity or 
background.   
The rhetorical situation assisted Clinton in his ability to connect to Latinos. This 
election happened right after one of the most anti-minority periods in modern history. 
California had passed Proposition 187, which limited certain public services to only 
those who could prove their citizenship.17  Two presidential candidates (Pete Wilson and 
Pat Buchanan) had run on the platform of closing American borders, and much of the 
Republican Party had supported immigrant bashing to the point that it became a part of 
mainstream political conversations.18 Initially, Clinton engaged the difficult immigration 
debate, siding with those who wanted to see our borders strengthened.  However, after 
an angry response from Latinos, Clinton quickly stopped emphasizing his agreement 
with Republicans and, instead, focused on the importance of opportunity, specifically, 
opportunity in education.19  
 Clinton used his more presidential ethos to attempt to prove to Latinos that he 
was a protector of the American Dream.  From his position as President, it was 
especially poignant in the rhetorical climate that he defended the American Dream and 
argued that all immigrants should have access to its promises.20  He became a protector 
of the Dream, which was important in the face of his opponent’s attacks on it.21  In 
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becoming the protector of the Dream, Clinton also became the narrator and, as the 
narrator, focused his attention on an issue that many Hispanics care about—education.22  
Clinton used educational institutions as the setting to define the American 
Dream. The majority of his campaign stops during the election were at educational 
facilities—his message was about the importance of education as a way to access the 
American Dream. As Latino journalist and researcher, Jorge Ramos explains: 
Whoever wants to win the Latino vote will have to address these two critical 
problems.  Hiring a mariachi band to play at a political rally is worthless if the 
rally itself doesn’t feature a comprehensive plan for improving the quality of life 
and the quality of education for Latino children.  It’s education and the economy, 
stupid.23 
 
Clinton used his campaign stops to discuss the ways that his second Administration 
would increase the quality of life and educational opportunity for all.  In a Spanish-
language ad entitled “Education,” the campaign made the connection clear, “President 
Clinton wants to prepare our youngsters for the future, and to have more opportunities to 
improve our quality of life.  That is why on the 5th of November I’m going to vote for 
President Clinton.”24 This message held narrative fidelity with the Hispanic audience, 
Clinton had proven to them that he cared about their issues and wanted to work to 
protect their right to education.  
  Both of these parts of the myth: the ethos and the setting had narrative validity 
for Latinos because they were glad to hear a politician, whom they had already trusted, 
again defending them. He presented himself as the embodiment of what César Chávez 
promised forty years earlier—that a politician would come along who understood them, 
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would defend them and they would elect him.  Clinton made the promise “WE WILL 
BE HEARD” true.   
2000 Election 
Against unimaginable odds, George W. Bush was able to reverse the 
Republican’s mistakes from the last six years and bring an increased proportion of 
Latinos into a party that had been labeled as anti-immigrant.  Bush certainly had more 
credibility than any other Republican candidate at this time.  He had been supportive of 
Latinos and Latino issues when very few in his party were.   As Governor of Texas, he 
had worked closely with Hispanics and made them a key part of his Administration.25  
This made him the ideal candidate for the Republican Party in 2000.  However, Bush 
had to overcome an overwhelming crisis of narrative validity.   
Republicans had created a narrative of the American Dream that did not include 
immigrants, especially immigrants who came to this country the “wrong way.”26  
Immigrants, even legal ones, were a drain on other hard-working Americans whose tax 
dollars were being used to educate, feed, clothe and give medical care to immigrant 
children. This Republican version of the immigrant narrative gave Bush’s campaign 
problems. Bush himself recognized the difficulty he faced, he commented once during 
the election, “I believe this party is anxious for a different style of campaign. I think the 
Republican Party has somehow gotten the image that we are not mindful of the concerns 
of new Americans.”27   Latinos believed Bush that the Republican Party was not 
“mindful of new Americans.”  This idea had narrative fidelity for Latinos because all of 
the policies of the last six years showed that Republicans felt that way.  Bush had to 
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prove to Hispanics that they were wrong--that there was room for them in the GOP and 
that was a difficult challenge.  
Initially, Bush tried to change Latinos’ minds by emphasizing his work in Texas 
on education, an important issue to many Hispanics.28  However, he was never able to 
prove to Latinos’ that he was going to be a different kind of Republican in general; he 
still had a problem of narrative fidelity.  Latinos trusted that Bush was different, but 
couldn’t trust that other Republicans would be different too.  They still questioned if 
Republicans could truly work with them.29  That is when Bush’s campaign found a 
unique way to try to calm their concerns. The campaign’s narrative evolved, they 
decided to use a totally different main character and narrator.  Bush brought in his half-
Mexican nephew, George P. Bush.  P. became the face of the campaign toward 
Hispanics.30  He was able to regain their confidence because he was able to show them 
that Republicans had changed, they had accepted him and allowed him to become the 
main character of the narrative. P. was the embodiment of everything that Latinos hoped 
for, the culmination of forty years of hard work.  A Latino who was the product of an 
integrated prominent family, and who was able to become a key part of the campaign—
and, as many referred to him, the future first Hispanic President.31  Whether that 
prediction comes true is unclear, but he calmed many Latinos’ fears and was able to 
regain narrative fidelity for the Bush campaign, because he was proof that not only was 
Bush a different kind of Republican, but that the Party overall had changed.   
 The campaign also used a new setting to set their version of the American 
Dream.  They wanted to make reference to the changing times, that there would be a 
   127 
 
new day in relations between Hispanics and Republicans. The “Nuevo Día” ads 
represented the change that Bush would bring.32 In the “Plan of Delano”, César Chávez 
encourages a change like the one Bush represented, “ . . .we want the existing social 
order to dissolve, we want a new social order.”  P. as the star of the “Nuevo Día” ads 
focused on his Latino heritage and how proud he was of his upbringing.  The setting 
represented a rebirth and renewal of the relationship between Latinos and Republicans.  
Shot in an open field of wildflowers and trees, P.’s message was simple.  The world is 
changing and we (the GOP and its candidate George W. Bush) are going to change with 
it—for the better.  
 This setting allowed Latinos to see that George W. Bush, with the help of P. and 
other Hispanics, was going to change the way the American Dream was defined.  
George W. Bush made many uses of the Spanish translation “el sueño Americano,” even 
going as far as to make “el sueño Americano, belongs to all Americans” one of his 
campaign slogans.33  This was truly a culmination of the promises of the “Plan of 
Delano”, “WE SHALL BE HEARD, GOD WILL NOT ABANDON US, WE SHALL 
ENDURE, UNITED WE SHALL STAND and WE SHALL OVERCOME.”34 
The American Dream as Narrative 
 The American Dream is a powerful narrative that many share, however, 
immigrants in particular feel an affinity for the opportunity that it offers.  During the 
presidential elections from 1992-2000 each candidate defined the Dream in specific 
ways that were especially poignant for Latinos.   
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 These new tellings of the American Dream myth valued specific characters—
characters who had been blessed by the American Dream.  In his 1992 telling of his own 
story, Clinton referred to the American Dream as a force that he could not control.  The 
lucky surprises in his life (his meeting with Kennedy, the educational opportunities that 
he was offered) were outside of his control, almost predestined for him, as his mother 
described in his biography.  Latinos want to know that the Dream is possible, they know 
that it requires work, and they are willing to work, but also feel there is some hope, some 
luck involved.  Clinton’s 1992 character had to work to gain success, but he was also 
blessed.  This is the kind of hope that brings many to America, and it is a belief that 
Latinos share.  George P. Bush is another character blessed by the American Dream.   
 P. is a most unique character in the telling of the American Dream Myth, he is 
blessed by being born into a politically powerful family and yet he is different.  His 
ethnicity set him apart from his uncle and others in his family.  But, as a first-generation 
American he represents the hope that brings many to America, the idea that their 
children will have opportunities the parents could not.  P. had opportunities that his 
mother could not have in Mexico.  However, because his mother came to America her 
children had access to education and other parts of the American Dream.  There were 
blessings, marriage into the well-established Bush family was a blessing, but P. was a 
hero because he never forgot who he really was—a person who was blessed by the 
American Dream.  
 The settings of the American Dream story are also important.  These settings 
varied greatly—from the decrepit and desolate to the fanciful and idyllic—but they 
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represented all the different places where the American Dream is possible.  Hope 
Arkansas is not a place where much hope seems to exist.  But, even a community as 
impoverished as Hope can be the birthplace of a President, because of the amazing 
ability of the Dream to permeate even the darkest corners of America.  The barrios of the 
Southwest appear to be hopeless, but as Clinton’s telling of the myth reminded Latinos, 
even people growing up in the barrios should have hope—because the American Dream 
can exist anywhere.    
 Education is central to the myth. Every election studied in this election referred 
to the importance of education in the efficacy of the American Dream.  Educational 
institutions that may seem hopeless can be the birthplace of the success the American 
Dream offers.  Little community colleges, small decrepit schools in Texas, elementary 
schools with no running water and no computers can also provide the Dream—to 
someone who is willing to work for it, like our heroes.  But with the help of other heroes, 
like a President who believes in education (like Clinton and Bush claimed to) the 
American Dream can be even more accessible, because they will work to make it more 
available to everyone.   
 These values, these characters, these settings have added to the rich rhetorical 
history of the American Dream myth.  As Cullen explained in The American Dream this 
is not a story that has an ending, as long as there is hope. These presidential candidates 
expanded the places where that hope could reach, and the people who could be blessed 
by the Dream. All of this culminated into a story that Latinos could relate to, that they 
shared and that rhetorically persuaded them to believe in these candidates. 
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Limitations on Research/Future Research Needed 
The media has created this image that Latinos are an important voting 
population, and that they must be watched. Every election covered in this research was 
referred to as the “Year of the Latino” and many articles were written about how 
Hispanics would elect the next President. Or candidates would often talk about how 
important Latinos are in this particular election. And, while it is true that the numbers do 
not lie and Latinos could be so very powerful, in 2008 it was predicted that 9.2 million 
Latinos could turn out to the polls.35 Other Hispanic authors (mostly journalists) have 
written about the potential power of Latino voters, but no one seems to be able to explain 
how to get them to stretch that power. Jorge Ramos in his book, The Latino Wave, 
argues that finding a candidate who will listen to Latino issues is an important part of 
that connection and, when Hispanics feel that a candidate truly understands them, and 
then they will vote for him or her.36  Ramos’s research seems a bit one-sided, when 
Ramos wrote his book he was a very public supporter of George W. Bush.  He was 
defending Bush’s strong 2000 showing, arguing that Bush had won because of his strong 
connection with Latinos.  However, no one could have predicted how the world would 
change by September 11, 2001 and how it would lead to a drastic change in the focus of 
the coming 2004 election.  
Other journalists, such as CNN’s Leslie Sanchez—the author of Los Republicanos, 
argue that Republicans need Latinos and that Latinos need Republicans.  “I have written 
this book on the belief that Republicans and Hispanics need one another in order to make 
a better America.  The Hispanic spirit of optimism, and enterprise, of faith and family, is 
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a spirit that fits naturally with the beliefs I hold as a Reagan Republican.”37  The thesis 
of her book is similar to Regan’s 1979 statement where he argues that Hispanics are 
Republicans “they just don’t know it.”38  This book makes the assumption that once 
Hispanics truly understand what Republicans stand for, they will want to join the GOP.  
However, there is no research to give credence to the claim.  Especially in these times 
when economic issues dominate the news and the average American is struggling with 
consumer confidence, it seems that Latinos will support the party who works to 
overcome their economic problems.39   
The struggle for the party that wins the allegiance of Latinos is to get those voters 
to the polls.  There is no magic formula that makes someone go to the polls and vote.  Of 
course, Latinos are at a disadvantage, while the number of Hispanics in the United States 
is high—the number who are, actually eligible to vote is only about one-third of the total 
number.40  This significantly decreases their ability to influence an election, and 
certainly influences their ability to take an election, as Ramos and Sanchez have argued. 
 The values in the “Plan of Delano” provide a start for understanding what 
Latinos are looking for in a political candidate. But, they are not a direct course of action 
for how to revitalize the Hispanic population and persuade them to get to the polls.  In 
his book, The Latino Wave, Jorge Ramos gives a list of ten things that will promote a 
Latino agenda: 
1. Improve Political Representation, 
2. Standardize Latino Immigrants’ Legal Situation and Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform, 
3. Learn Spanish and English: One Language Just Isn’t Enough, 
4. Lift Hispanics out of poverty: Create Access to Better Jobs and Health Care, 
5. Address School Dropout Rates, 
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6. Fight Crime and Make our Communities Safer, 
7. Forge an Alliance with other Minorities, 
8. Make Latin America a Prominent part of U.S. Foreign Policy, 
9. Streamline the Process of Gaining Citizenship, and 
10. Understand the Hispanic Experience.41 
 
Many of these suggestions are grounded in the same belief system that created the “Plan 
of Delano;” the idea of working with other minority groups, providing equal access to 
important rights like education and changing the culture to understand the Hispanic 
experience. All of these ideas are also embedded in the “Plan of Delano.”   
2004 and 2008 elections 
Narratives during the 2004 election were quite different from the previous three 
elections. After the attack on September 11th 2001, the nation focused on Homeland 
Security and Defense, and the 2004 election reflected that change.  Both candidates, 
John Kerry and George W. Bush, spent the election focused on defense and foreign 
policy: which are two issues that do not typically resonate with Latinos.42  However, the 
2008 election brought the American Dream back to the forefront of a national 
conversation in its discussion of whether the U.S. was ready for its first African-
American President.   
 The 2008 election deserves its own rhetorical analysis. The historic run of the 
first African-American President was almost entirely focused on the American Dream.  
Barack Obama’s life story is a perfect example of the American Dream.  The story of a 
biracial son of an African and an American woman connected with many minorities. 
However, Obama still struggled to connect with Latino voters.  From the beginning, 
there was the feeling that, with an African-American presidential candidate, Latinos’ 
   133 
 
issues would be ignored.  There is also a historical divide between the two groups that 
has always caused some tension.43  Obama attempted to discredit this belief by telling 
one crowd in Los Angeles on February 1, 2008, “In the past few weeks, we’ve heard 
some cynical talk about how black and white and Latino folks cannot come together.  I 
am reminded of the Latino brothers and sisters I worked alongside on the streets of 
Chicago decades ago.”44 Obama’s attempts at commonality did not work, in part, 
because of his Democratic opponent.   
Too many Hispanics still had fond feelings for the Clintons, and felt more 
comfortable with Hillary. As one observer explained after the February 1st speech, “It’s 
the marquee value. They still remember [Bill] Clinton and those whole eight years.  
Obama comes out of nowhere, and Latinos are like, ‘What? An African American?’  
[Hispanics] recognize the Clintons and are comfortable with them.”45  It wasn’t until 
June, when Obama clinched the nomination, that Hispanics began to support the former 
Senator from Illinois.46  Obama’s eventual success was seen by many as a win for 
African-Americans, as well as Latinos.  Obama went on to nominate three Latinos to 
Cabinet-level positions—Bill Richardson to Department of Commerce (Richardson 
withdrew his nomination early in the process), Hilda Solis to Department of Labor and 
Ken Salazar to Department of Interior.  And as of the writing of this dissertation, Obama 
has nominated the first Latina, Sonia Sotomayer, to the Supreme Court.47 These 
nominations reflected a commitment to Latinos and their issues that has led to a great 
deal of goodwill between President Obama and Latinos. 
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 I believe the key to understanding how to harness the Latino wave, as Ramos 
calls it, to influence politics is to understand how to get Latinos to the polls.  I believe 
this research has proven that the use of the American Dream Myth is one way to connect 
with Latinos, and in each case it seemed to lead to electoral success.  However, I feel 
there is still a great deal of room to discuss other rhetorical ways to influence Hispanics 
to go to the polls.  
 Other researchers have evaluated the efficacy of “non-issue” ads, which are 
advertisements that encourage a positive feeling among voters without focusing on a 
particular issue.  Early research seems to show that these ads are successful in 
persuading Latinos to change their view of the different political parties.  They were 
used with some success in 2004, when they were first introduced in Spanish.  I believe 
more research into this type of advertisement would give rhetorical critics a better 
understanding of what Latinos find persuasive.  
 Another area of future research that is needed is in a general understanding of 
what constitutes rhetoric in Hispanic cultures.  When I initially began researching this 
topic, the only rhetorical criticisms of Latino-American rhetoric I could find were the 
Hammerback and Jensen books on César Chávez.  This is an area that is severely 
underrepresented.  Understanding how Latinos talk about themselves, about their values, 
about their culture, about what it means to be a part of American culture, about how to 
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